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Abstract 
Many empirical studies reveal that Japanese aid allocative behaviour is not humanitarian. It 
is viewed as commercially motivated and geopolitically motivated. It is further reputed that 
Japanese development assistance program have earned a reputation being concentrated in 
Far East Asian region. I reexamine these issues. In this paper, I also perform an econometric 
analysis of aid allocation, covering 6 aid donors and 168 aid recipients over the period 1990-
2002 and accounting for both altruistic and selfish donor motives but with more regional 
variation. The results indicate a significant difference in Japanese aid allocative behaviour 
towards Far East Asian region and the other regions. The behaviour is highly poverty 
focused in Far East Asia but selfish motives are also high. Comparing to aid allocation to Far 
East Asia, Japanese aid allocation to the other regions is less altruistic and selfish. It further 
confirms commercial motives have been less important in both regions while political 
motives have been enhanced in the other regions over time. At same time, altruistic motives 
have been weakened over time regardless of the regions. I also find the evidence that US 
pressure toward Japanese foreign aid policy has impact on Japanese aid allocation. 
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1. Introduction 
Japan has been one of the largest donors in most of years in 1990s for both bilateral and 
multilateral aid. Nishigaki and Shimomura (1998) assert that Japanese aid is open and fair 
due to high untied rate and low rate of winners of Japanese firms or organization in yen-loan 
projects. Nevertheless, Japanese aid is not free of criticism. Some studies insist that Japan 
used aid as an important instrument in the re-establishment of its trade and investment in 
1950s and 1960s (Ozawa 1989; Tisch and Wallas 1994; The ministry foreign affairs of Japan 
2007). Japanese government hasn’t disregard improvement of its aid allocative behaviour. 
They mention humanitarian assistance in explaining in their motives in its official 
development assistance (ODA) charter and proclaim regarding policies. Cooray and 
Shahiduzzaman (2004), however, contend that Japanese aid policy is still simply a 
continuation of her domestic post-war economic recovery strategy; that is, concern for her 
domestic prosperity and security. 
 
Japanese aid performance has not been evaluated favorably in many studies. Evaluation of 
donor performance by Easterly (2002) ranked Japan in 7th among 21 donors. He evaluated 
donors with unweighted average of rankings with five different criterion for donors’ aid 
performances: high negative correlation of aid per capita with income of recipient, high 
partial correlation of aid per capita with good institutions in recipient, partial correlation of 
aid per capita with Burnside-Dollar policy index1, low degree of tied rate, and the amount of 
aid relative to donor income. Berthelemy (2006b) evaluated selfish behaviours of donors and 
classified donors into three clusters: “altruistic”, “moderately selfish”, and “selfish”. He 
classified Japan into “moderately selfish” cluster. He defined “moderately selfish” donors as 
donors who have a trade intensity parameter non-significantly different from other donors. 
 
Both political and commercial motives have been featured in the criticisms. Alesina and 
Dollar (2000) examined the aid allocation of various donors over the period 1970 to 1994. 
They found that political motives had a positive impact on the amount of aid allocated by 
Japan. Isopi and Mavrotas (2006) examined them over period 1980 to 2003. They found 
                                                
1
 The Burnside-Dollar policy index is a composite index of inflation, government budget surplus/deficit as 
percent of GDP, and the Sachs-Warner openness classification. 
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amount of Japanese bilateral aid is related to commercial motives. Other studies such as 
Berthelemy and Tichit (2002), Cooray and Shahiduzzaman (2004), and Canavire et al (2005) 
also concluded similarly. The study of Berthelemy (2006a) over period 1980 to 1999 found 
that the commercial motives even influenced on multilateral aid decisions. The study by 
Canavire et al (2005) further found that economic needs of recipients did not exert a relevant 
influence on Japanese aid allocation. The study by Isopi and Mavrotas (2006) also concluded 
that both economic and social needs did not exert significant influence. However, 
Berthelemy (2006b) asserts that those motives resulted in large amount of Japanese aid goes 
to Asia because those countries are important for Japan in terms of geopolitical strategy and 
commercial interests. 
 
On the other hand, some studies such as Berthelemy and Tichit (2002), Dollar and Levin 
(2004), and Isopi and Mavrotas(2006) found that Japanese aid allocation is policy selective 
and does go to recipients with good policy and institution. Dollar and Levin (2004) also 
asserted that the pattern of giving large amount to Asia reflects this policy since many of 
Asian countries are well governed. 
 
Both the criticisms and praises of Japanese aid policies seem to be ascribable to the pattern 
of giving large amount of aid to Asia. This study examines how aid allocation in that region 
differs from the other regions and changes in the bias of Japanese aid allocation to Asia over 
time. 
 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives descriptive analysis of Japanese aid. 
Section 3 describes data set. Econometric methodology issues are reviewed in section 4. 
Section 5 presents the econometric analysis for behaviour of collective donors and individual 
donors covering the period 1990-2002. In section 6 we conduct a sensitivity analysis to test 
the robustness of our results. The analysis is performed in two parts. First, we will 
investigate how various factors influence Japanese aid allocation. Second, we will compare 
the results with an alternative estimation method. The last section concludes the paper. 
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2. Japanese aid 
This section, first, presents features of Japanese aid allocation, how current aid pattern has 
been formulated and overall regional distribution. In next sub-section, we discuss 
diversifications of Japanese aid distribution by region. 
2.1 Features of Japanese aid allocation 
2.1.1 How current Japanese allocation has been formulated 
Although nowadays Japan is considered as a major donor, Japan used to be an aid recipient. 
From 1946 to 1951, American aid programmes such as Government and Relief in Occupied 
Areas (GARIOA) and Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas (EROA) provided 
essential emergency assistance for helping recovery from the confusion and devastation of 
the immediate post WWII. From 1953 Japan had received loans from World Bank until 1966. 
To graduate from being an aid recipient and then go on not only to join the aid donors but to 
become one of the world’s largest aid-giving countries is a unique history unparalleled in the 
annals of aid. This experience may reflect the tenet of Japanese aid giving activity, 
supporting “self-help”, the attempt to change the status quo as much as possible by oneself 
without depending on outside help, to promote development by and for oneself. 
 
Here, let us see historical backgrounds of Japanese aid. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan (2007) classifies history of Japanese aid into four periods.  
 
The first period (1954-1963): Period of reparations and commencing aid 
On 6th of October in 1954, Japan joined membership to the Colombo plan2 and started with a 
technical cooperation program. At same time, with peace treaty and reparation and economic 
cooperation treaty with Burma3, Japan commenced reparations to Asian countries to build up 
what had been damaged during the war. In 1958, Japan commenced the first economic 
                                                
2
 The Colombo Plan was a system of regional cooperation with headquarters in Colombo, Sri Lanka, that was 
launched in 1950 to promote the economic and social development of South and Southeast Asia (Nishigaki and 
Shimomura 1998). 
3
 Present Myanmar 
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cooperation to other countries, government loans to India. But the majority of both types of 
aid was tied aid4. Thus there were commercial motives behind its aid and they rendered its 
aid component weak in this period. 
 
The second period (1964-1976): expansion period 
Japanese foreign aid expanded quantitatively and become manifold with advance of 
international position due to rapid economic growth. Japan made endeavour for qualitative 
efficiency by commencing grant aid, enhancing untied aid, and so forth. Japan also expanded 
the list of recipients of its aid regionally. Japanese aid had been almost confined to Asia in 
the 1960s, however, the oil crisis of 1973 changed Japanese aid policy due to Japan’s 
vulnerability from heavy energy imports. It has to be noted that aid was used as diplomatic 
tool to restore neutralist credibility and to placate Arab anger from Japan’s alliance with 
USA and support to Israel.  
 
Figure 2-1 : Changes in the amount of aid of major donors for 1971-2005  
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[Note] Amount is current price in US dollars. 
Transaction is ODA. 
Source: OECD (2007) 
 
                                                
4
 The recipient of tied aid is obliged to spend it on goods and services in the donor country(Szirmai 2005). 
5 
 
 
 
The third period (1977-1988): period for planned expansion 
Subsequent to completion of reparations, Japan implemented planned expansion of foreign 
aid with five periods. Through the plan, not only had Japan assisted economic infrastructure5, 
but also Japan assisted social infrastructure6. Moreover, in this period, the aid was distributed 
to varieties of recipients, especially to the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. 
 
The fourth period (1989-present): major donor period 
As we can see from figure 2-1, in 1989, Japan overtook USA and became the largest donor 
in the world. Japan retained lead until 2000 except 1990, despite stagnation. In 2001, Japan 
surrendered the position to USA. In subsequent period, although ODA of other major donors 
such as France, UK, and Germany increased considerably, Japan still retains second place. 
 
2.1.2 Tied Aid 
As mentioned above, Japanese aid was initially highly tied in order to promote its export 
with the aim of own prosperity. Tied aid has been considered as an ineffective form of 
giving aid. Tied aid functions as an export credit for the donor country and it reduces the 
total value of aid, because recipient is not free to use the financial resources provided to buy 
the cheapest and best goods and services available on international or domestic markets. 
Often the prices of imports from the donor country will be 20 percent to 30 percent above 
world market prices. Moreover, it is very likely that the recipients are forced to buy goods 
that are not optimally suited to their needs and local circumstances. Furthermore, a country 
may end up with many different and incompatible brands of the same product from different 
countries (Szirmai 2005). Hence, over the years, the issue has been discussed in the the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)7, culminating in agreement by Development Co-
operation Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies on a Recommendation to untie ODA to the 
                                                
5
 Transportation, telecommunication, energy, and so forth. 
6
 Education, health, and so forth. 
7
 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is one of the key forums in which the major bilateral donors 
work together to increase the effectiveness of their common efforts to support sustainable development. 
(OECD 2007). Current members are Aurtralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, USA, and commission of the European Communities. 
6 
 
 
least developed countries8 at the DAC High Level Meeting in April 2001. The objectives of 
the Recommendation are to untie ODA to the least developed countries to the greatest extent 
possible, to promote and ensure adequate ODA flows, in particular to the least developed 
countries, and to achieve balanced efforts among DAC Members in untying aid. The 
Recommendation also recognizes that reinforcing partner country responsibility for 
procurement and the ability of the private sector to compete for aid funded contracts are 
required in order for the Recommendation to deliver its full benefits. 
 
Figure 2-2: The change of share of untied aid in overall aid from 1980 to 2005 
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[Note] Aid status is bilateral commitment.. 
Source: OECD (2007) 
 
As shown in figure 2-2, Japan has attained high untied rate. From 1980s, not only did 
Japanese untied rate catch up with other donors, but it exceeded their level. Furthermore, a 
study by Nishigaki and Shimomura (1998) showed that around 70 percent of winners for 
yen-loan projects in 1990s are non-Japanese bidders, and what’s more, most of the non-
Japanese winners are not even local subsidiaries of Japanese firms. Those facts allow us to 
infer decreasing commercial motives. 
                                                
8
 The agreement was issued on 14th of May in 2001 and the progress of implementation of the agreement was 
reported in OECD (2006a). The review was subject to some amendments. The latest version can be found in 
OECD(2006b). 
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2.1.3 Share in total GNI 
If we examine the absolute amount of ODA of Japan in table 2-1, it is the second highest 
among all DAC countries after USA and its share in total ODA exceeds 10 percents.  
 
Table 2-1: Donor profile 
 
ODA  as % of GNI 
 
ODA 
(US 
million $) 
shares in 
total ODA 
ODA per 
capita 2003 2004 2005 
All Donors, Total 120402.57 100.00  121.54  - - - 
DAC Countries, Total 106777.11 88.68  123.47  - - - 
Australia 1680.16 1.40  82.64  0.25 0.25 0.25 
Austria 1573.32 1.31  191.17  0.2 0.23 0.52 
Belgium 1963.36 1.63  188.24  0.6 0.41 0.53 
Canada 3756.34 3.12  116.01  0.24 0.27 0.34 
Denmark 2108.92 1.75  388.38  0.84 0.85 0.81 
Finland 901.94 0.75  171.47  0.35 0.37 0.46 
France 10026.22 8.33  165.07  0.4 0.41 0.47 
Germany 10082.16 8.37  122.22  0.28 0.28 0.36 
Greece 384.22 0.32  34.65  0.21 0.16 0.17 
Ireland 718.94 0.60  179.74  0.39 0.39 0.42 
Italy 5090.9 4.23  86.98  0.17 0.15 0.29 
Japan 13146.58 10.92  103.02  0.2 0.19 0.28 
Luxembourg 256.39 0.21  569.76  0.81 0.83 0.86 
Netherlands 5114.69 4.25  313.02  0.8 0.73 0.82 
New Zealand 273.52 0.23  66.88  0.23 0.23 0.27 
Norway 2786.05 2.31  600.44  0.92 0.87 0.94 
Portugal 377.12 0.31  36.47  0.22 0.63 0.21 
Spain 3018.3 2.51  69.85  0.23 0.24 0.27 
Sweden 3361.68 2.79  371.46  0.79 0.78 0.94 
Switzerland 1766.56 1.47  237.12  0.39 0.41 0.44 
United Kingdom 10767.26 8.94  179.45  0.34 0.36 0.47 
United States 27622.48 22.94  93.19  0.15 0.17 0.22 
[Note] ODA is measured by net disbursements 
           The first three columns are records of 2005 
Source: OECD (2007) 
 
Absolute amount of aid, however, cannot explain fully donor’s contribution. As used in 
evaluation by Easterly (2002), amount of aid relative to donors’ income is also widely 
adopted as an indicator of donors’ contribution. In 2002, world leaders pledged to make 
concrete efforts towards the targets of 0.7 percent of their GNI in foreign aid in order to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 9  at the Monterrey Financing for 
                                                
9
 The MDGs are eight goals to be achieved by 2015 that respond to the world's main development challenges, 
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality and 
empower women, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a global partnership for 
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Development Conference of UN. Notwithstanding all DAC donor countries except Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden do not fulfill the target. That of Japan is far 
from the target and the 6th smallest among all DAC donor countries after Greece, Portugal, 
USA, Australia, and New Zealand. Even if we compare with ODA per capita, it is 8th 
smallest. This was one of the factors dragging the ranking by the Easterly (2002) down. 
Notwithstanding, if we compare with highly populous donors such as USA, UK, Italy, 
Germany, France, and Spain, it is not notably small. Furthermore, the condition is improving. 
From 2002 to 2005, the share of Japanese ODA in its GNI increased 0.08 percent, from 0.20 
percent to 0.28 percent. In this period, as we can see from the figure 2-1, absolute amount of 
ODA was increased despite shrinking national income10. 
 
2.1.4 Regional Distribution 
Even though Japanese aid has been dispersed more regionally, there still is criticism, for 
example, Berthelemy (2006b) that large amount of Japanese aid is prone to go to Asian 
countries. It can be confirmed from figure 2-3. 
 
Figure 2-3: Changes in the Japanese ODA distribution by region for 1980-2005 
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development .They were drawn at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000. For further information see 
(UN 2007). 
10The GNI for Japan were 4 759 021.28 US million dollars in 2004, and 4 675 017.26 US million dollars in 
2005. (OECD 2007) 
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(b) DAC countries, total 
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[Note] ODA is measured by net disbursements 
Amount type is converted into 2004 US constant price. 
Countries have been classified in the OECD sense. For further information (see OECD 2007) 
Source: OECD (2007) 
 
 During sample years, from 1980 to 2005, Far East Asia has been the leading destination of 
Japanese aid except 2005. The abrupt rise of the share in the Middle East attributes to 
demeanour of Japanese government sympathizing USA’s foreign policy to the Middle East. 
Comparing with total DAC donors, the share in Asia is notably higher. On the other hand, 
share of sub Saharan Africa is significantly small even though it is the major destination 
from total DAC donors. Eradicating poverty in sub-Saharan Africa has been discussed as an 
important issue at several conferences of UN and, what’s more, major donors proclaimed to 
intensify aid to the region on Kananaskis summit on June in 2002 (Shirai 2004). Many 
donors moved into action and the share in the region had dramatically risen afterwards. We 
can ascribe recent decrease to abrupt rise of share in the Middle East. During this period, the 
sub-Saharan African share in Japanese aid has been almost stable. 
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2.1.5 Distribution by Income 
As we can see from figure 2-4, the share of low middle income countries in Japanese ODA 
has fluctuated around 50 percent through all sample years, from 1980 to 2005, while that in 
total DAC countries has fluctuated around 30 percent. USA, the largest donor, is also prone 
to allocate more ODA to low middle income countries, especially to Egypt. ODA to low 
middle income countries from USA and Japan accounts approximately 60 percent of ODA 
from total DAC countries. It implies that share of Japanese ODA allocation to low middle 
income countries is much larger than other DAC donors excluding USA, in practice. 
Moreover, the share of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Japanese ODA has been much 
lower than that in total DAC countries. Although many of leading recipients of Japanese 
ODA, especially countries in Far East Asia such as China, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Philippines, the second, third, fourth, and fifth largest recipient of Japanese ODA 
respectively in 2005, already sloughed off from LDCs, Japan retains them as leading 
recipients. 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Changes in the Japanese ODA distribution by income class for 1980-2005 
(a) Japan 
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(b) DAC countries, total 
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[Note] ODA is measured by net disbursements 
Amount type is converted into 2004 US constant price. 
Countries have been classified in the OECD sense. For further information (see OECD 2007) 
Source: OECD (2007) 
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2.2 How aid toward Asia and other regions differ 
As we have discussed so far, recipients in Far East Asia are dominant in Japanese aid. The 
preference towards the area is clearly indicated in ODA charter provided by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan. It describes Asia as Japan’s priority region, a region with close 
relationship to Japan and which can have major impact on Japan’s stability and prosperity 
(The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2007). It further mentions that they diversify 
assistance approaches by region. For Far East Asia, the aim for aid is to correct disparity 
within the region, to sustain their growth, and to enhance relationship between Japan. For 
other regions, it only makes allusions to support them based on individual conditions and in 
order to eradicate poverty and promote peace. This philosophy might create diversification 
between aid toward Far East Asia and others. This sub-section explores how Japanese aid 
component toward Far East Asia is distinct from the others.  
 
Table 2-2: Flow of ODA to developing countries in 2005(net disbursement basis) 
    
Total DAC Japan 
    Amount 
(US million 
dolllars) 
Share in total 
ODA(%) 
Amount 
(US million 
dolllars) 
Share in total 
ODA (%) 
ODA 106777.11 100 13146.58 100 
 Bilateral ODA 82133.43 76.92 10406.21 79.16 
  Grant aid11 83109.26 77.83 9194.68 69.94 
   Investment Project aid 6266.92 5.87 696.04 5.29 
   Programme aid 11849.55 11.10 274.63 2.09 
   Technical cooperation 20925.60 19.60 1873.09 14.25 
   Developmental food aid 886.54 0.83 58.44 0.44 
   Emergency / Distress Relief 7169.46 6.71 515.85 3.92 
   Debt forgiveness 24962.63 23.38 4775.69 36.33 
   Support to NGOs 2374.74 2.22 282.83 1.15 
   Others(including 
administrative costs) 6602.71 6.03 718.11 5.46 
  Non-grant -975.83 -0.91 1211.53 9.216 
   Loans by government 1790.42 1.68 2433.77 18.51 
   Offsetting Entry for debt 
forgiveness -2766.26 -2.59 -1222.24 -9.30 
 Multilateral ODA 24643.71 23.08 2740.37 20.84 
  Grants and capital subscriptions 24659.91 23.09 2740.37 20.84 
  Concessional lending -16.21 -0.01 0 0 
[Note] Amount type is in constant 2005 US dollars. 
Source: OECD (2007) 
                                                
11
 The form of financial cooperation that helps developing countries acquires what they need but does not 
require repayment in return. 
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From table 2-2, we can see several clear distinctions. First, share of project aid dominates 
that of programme aid in Japan whereas total DAC shows opposite state. Second, share of 
debt forgiveness in Japan is much higher, approximately 13 percent, than that in total DAC. 
Third, share of non-grant element in Japan is also larger than that in total DAC. Especially, 
the share of loans by government is considerably larger, more than 16 percent. Subsequently 
in this sub-section, we will investigate further whether these distinctions were ascribable to 
the regional diversification. 
 
Figure 2-5 depicts how each component is distributed by region. Each component shows 
peculiar regional pattern. 
 
Figure 2-5: Regional distribution by each component of Japanese ODA in 2004 
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[Note] Source: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan (2007) 
 
For technical cooperation, Far East Asia occupies more than half of total technical 
cooperation. Technical cooperation is defined as activities the primary purpose of which is to 
augment the level of knowledge, skills and technical know-how in developing countries 
(Szirmai 2005). Japanese government recognizes this type of aid can be effective regardless 
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of recipients’ income. Indeed, although Far East Asia occupies large part, this component is 
relatively fairly distributed regionally. 
 
Figure 2-6: Components of Japanese ODA by region in 2004 
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[Note] Source: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan (2007) 
 
The reason the amount for this aid is large in Japan may be ascribable to the extremely few 
staff members involved in distributing Japanese aid. Thus debt forgiveness does not require 
high degree of interference of decision makers in affairs of other countries, and a large 
amount of money can be disbursed. Then Japan can keep its operational budget at modest 
level. 
 
If we look at the regional distribution, Africa occupies more than half of total debt 
forgiveness while none of debt forgiveness is given to Far East Asia. Japan gives debt 
forgiveness mainly to comply with two things; one is an agreement at the Trade and 
Development Board (TDB) of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in 1978 which urged donor countries to provide debt relief to developing 
countries, and the other is an outcome of a comprehensive review by IDA and the IMF, 
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including public consultations, Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiatives12 , 
which is stipulated to ensure deep, broad, and fast debt relief and thereby contribute toward 
growth, poverty reduction, and debt sustainability in the poorest, most heavily indebted 
countries. Hence, low income countries likely receive it. Indeed, debt forgiveness is principal 
ODA component in Africa, south and central Asia, and Latin America where many countries 
are in distress. 
 
One of the Japanese aid tenets is utilizing non-grant aid, loans, to induce recipients’ effort 
for “self-help”. Loans are given in the belief that a recipient of non-grant aid is motivated not 
only to use the money more effectively but also to make every effort to complete the project 
and make it work due to the obligation to pay interest and repay the principle. Thus, contrary 
to the international perceptions that more grant aid should be allocated, non-grant aid share 
takes large part in Japanese aid. Project loan13 is dominant component in Japanese non-grant 
aid. The role for government loan is complement for essential resource for its development. 
Japan thinks economic and social infrastructures are inevitable in order to materialize 
sustainable growth. However, it is too burdening for developing countries to establish those 
infrastructure only through their own market mechanism (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2007). Therefore, Japan highly involves projects for economic and social infrastructures by 
giving governmental loan, especially so large projects that cannot be managed by project 
grant aid. From an international perspective, this is one of the unique features of Japanese 
aid. Söderberg (1996) asserts that the reason Japan puts stress on large non-grant aid ascribes 
to sources of ODA. About 50 percent of the money for aid comes from the General Account 
Budget whereas another 50 percent comes from the Fiscal Loan and Investment Programme 
which consists of money from postal savings, pensions and other civilian savings which 
people expect to be repaid with interest. This makes it difficult to give money in the form of 
grants. Also, loan projects in the field of infrastructure is safety investment since empirically 
it has directly generated money. 
 
More than 60 percent of non-grant aid was given to Far East Asia. Loans are considered 
unsuitable for the poorest countries of the world as their ability to repay debt appears 
                                                
12
 For further information, see World Bank (2007). 
13
 A project loan is made for a specific project plan undertaken for the purpose of economic development. The 
most representative example would be support for simple cohesive unit of plan and equipment investment, for 
example, the building of infrastructure such as power plants, dams, ports, roads and filtration plants, or the 
construction of oil refineries, fertilizer factories and other types of plants (Nishigaki and Shimomura 1998). 
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doubtful. This may be the one of the reasons that non grant aid predominates in the aid to Far 
East Asia. In addition to that and geopolitical stakes, Söderberg (1996) asserts that projects 
of economic infrastructure in Far East Asia will give benefits to Japan in long run through 
increase trade and possibilities to locate production in the area where wages are lower and it 
is geographically convenient. 
 
If we glance at the component of grant aid, the amount of project aid14 dominates that of 
programme aid15 in spite of that total DAC shows opposite pattern. Since the early 1980s, 
donors have realized that any positive impacts of aid are nullified if bad macro-economic 
policies are being pursued, or if institutions at the micro level are hostile to entrepreneurship, 
investment or growth of production and productivity. Hence, since then, aid has been 
increasingly linked with a “policy dialogue”, aimed at improvement of macro-economic 
policy and institutional reform. Also the dialogue element in programme aid requires the 
active commitment and involvement of policy makers of recipient countries. In this context, 
there has been a shift from project aid to programme aid (Szirmai 2005). Although Japan 
diverges in their emphasis on programme aid, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan have 
set policies for programme aid such as in “ODA inspection and reform” which is proclaimed 
in 2006. Therefore, this pattern is likely changed in the future.  
 
Some detail of Japanese project aid and programme aid is presented in figure 2-7. Asia’s 
share in project aid is the largest among all regions while that in programme aid is not large, 
below 25 percent. Japanese preference on project aid to Asia which is discussed above for 
non-grant aid may be consequent the pattern. The Middle East’s share in programme aid 
exceeds 60 percent. This is because Japan disbursed large amount for establishment for 
peace and prevention for conflict which is accounted as programme aid. In this connection, 
the countries in Middle East receive large amount of Emergency aid as well which is 
accounted as other grant aid in table 2-2, thereby, the Middle East’s share in other grant is 
large in figure 2-5. 
 
                                                
14
 Under the heading of project aid, support is provided for a consistent set of activities with a specified 
duration and a well-defined objective. Project aid makes available specific capital assets or packages of 
technical assistance. An important component of project aid consists of infrastructural works, such as roads, 
harbours, dams, irrigation projects, energy projects or telecommunications projects (Szirmai 2005). 
15
 In the case of programme aid, financial support is provided to governments in the form of financial grants or 
concessional loans in support of economic policy programmes. Programme aid may be provided for the benefit 
of the entire economy or for specific sectors (Szirmai 2005).  
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Figure 2-7: Regional distribution of Japanese project and programme ODA in 2004 
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[Note] Source: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan (2007) 
Due to unavailability of data, aggregated Asia data is reported here. 
 
In this section, we have investigated how aid towards Far East Asia differs from others. The 
aid to the region is mainly project loan and project investment, and technical cooperation 
whereas Africa and other poor countries receive large portion of debt forgiveness and 
countries in the Middle East are given large portion of programme aid and emergency aid. 
The aid to Far East Asia can be considered as effective with aim of sustain growth, but at 
same time, they have possibility to give benefit to Japan. So far, aid to Africa does not seem 
to be distorted by selfish motives, however, only small amount of aid is given. But evident 
so far is not enough to justify it. In subsequent sections, we will investigate further by 
quantitative analysis whether commercial motives and political motives are really behind the 
allocation, if there are, in what magnitude. We will also explore regional distinctions, 
especially Far East Asia and the others. Then we will examine whether the findings in 
previous studies such as Alesina and Dollar (2000) are still upheld. 
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3. Preliminary data analysis and data definition 
The sample for this study covers 168 aid recipients, 6 donors including Japan, spanning the 
period from 1990 to 2005. USA, UK, France, and Germany are chosen as a proxy of leading 
donors in DAC of the OECD. Norway is chosen as a proxy of a donor which earns a 
reputation for altruistic donors that put emphasis on democracy and human rights in their 
development assistance among the DAC donors in many previous studies.(e.g., Gates and 
Hoeffler 2004; Isopi and Mavrotas 2006) 
 
The dependent variable in this study is per capita net ODA disbursements16. In some of other 
related studies, however, commitments 17  are opted as dependent variable on behalf of 
disbursements (e.g., Isopi and Mavrotas 2006; Berthelemy 2006a). Both options possess 
intrinsic advantages. Disbursements reflect the resource transfers actually taking place more 
accurately whereas commitments better reflect donors’ decision because donors have total 
control of the commitments, compared to disbursements which depend in part on the 
recipients’ willingness and administrative capacity to request committed resources. Despite 
the existence of controversy, Neumayer (2003) showed that estimations are unlikely to be 
affected much by the choice of either commitments or disbursements as the two are highly 
correlated. In order to neutralize the effect of inflation, all values for the variable are 
converted into US dollars at 2004 constant price. Some of the values are negative. This is 
due to the re-payments of loans. 
 
Explanatory variables are chosen in terms of recipients’ needs, policy performance, self-
interest motives of donors, and other factors which can be stimulants to the dependent 
variable. 
                                                
16
 Disbursements represent the actual international transfer of financial resources. They may be recorded at one 
of several stages: provision of goods and services, placing of funds at the disposal of the recipient in an 
earmarked fund or account, withdrawal of funds by the recipient from an earmarked fund or account, payment 
by the donor of invoices on behalf of the recipient, etc. The disbursement mechanism used tends to vary as a 
function of the type of financial (or technical) co-operation flow involved (OECD 2007). 
 
17
 A Commitment is a firm obligation expressed in an agreement or equivalent contract and supported by the 
availability of public funds, undertaken by the government, an official agency of the reporting country or an 
international organisation, to furnish assistance of a specified amount under agreed financial terms and 
conditions and for specific purposes, for the benefit of a recipient country(OECD 2007). 
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Since income per capita may be the most straightforward indicator of needs, here, we use 
GDP per capita as a proxy of recipients’ needs. With same reason of net ODA per capita, 
this variable is also converted into US dollars at 2004 constant price. If aid is allocated on 
the basis of recipient needs, in another words donors are poverty focused, poorer countries 
should receive more aid, and richer countries receive less. With this regards, the expected 
sign for coefficient of this variable is negative. 
 
Recently, there is general consensus that aid works better in a good institutional policy 
environment. So-called good policy environment would be environment under maintained 
private property rights, highly open to foreign trade, low level of corruption, vigorous 
investment in education, and so forth. Under weak institutional policy environment the 
effective and efficient use of society's resources is inhibited, therefore, it is adverse to 
effective use of aid. Indeed, Collier and Dollar (2001) found that as polices and institutions 
are improved, the cost of poverty reduction is lowered, so that for a given amount of aid 
more people can be lifted out of poverty. This suggests donors take quality of institutional 
and policy environment of recipients into account in their aid allocation. An indicator which 
measure quality of recipients’ governance should be introduced to this analysis. The quality 
of governance is difficult to measure and there are no unanimous indicators for that. Here, I 
opt for “the Freedom House index of civil liberty”18 as an index of sound institution/policy 
of recipients.  This index measures freedom according to two broad categories: political 
rights and civil liberties. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political 
process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, 
compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives 
who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil 
liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state (Freedom 
House 2007). Each country is assigned a numerical rating, on a scale of 1 to7, for political 
rights and an analogous rating for civil liberties; a rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of 
freedom and 7 the least amount of freedom. I take the average of these two indicators for 
each recipient for each year. I refer to this indicator as “government” onwards. With the 
                                                
18
 In principle, the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment(CPIA) (see IDA 2003 and 
earlier versions) or Kaufmann index (see Kaufmann et al 2006) may be better indicator for assessment of 
governance because they contain more comprehensive aspects. Due to the unavailability of sufficient data, I opt 
freedom house index for this study. 
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premise that good governance attracts more aid and donors are policy focused, I expect this 
independent variable gives positive effect on amount of aid, namely negative sign. 
 
It can be expected that absolute amount of aid increases with population of the recipient. 
Nevertheless, Isenman (1976) and Dowling and Hiemenz (1985) pointed out that less 
populous countries receive more per capita aid than more populous ones. Namely, the 
absolute amount of aid may increase with population whereas rate of return decreases with it. 
A wide range of reasons is offered in explanation of this bias from decreasing marginal 
benefits of aid allocation as population increases, to the limited capacity of large countries to 
absorb additional amounts of aid and potentially greater aid effectiveness in small countries. 
For this reason, expected sign for the coefficient of this variable is negative since my 
dependent variable is aid per capita, not overall aid to a recipient. 
 
Table 3-1 presents the Spearman rank correlation19 between the bilateral aid per capita and 
each of variables introduced so far. All variables for all periods show signs as what we 
expected above at statistically significant level. These results are, however, only indicative, 
since they do not take into account of the overall context in which the performances are 
observed. 
 
Table 3-1:  Spearman rank correlation between bilateral aid per capita and variables 
of recipient countries 
 1990-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002 
GDP per capita -0.165*** -0.187*** -0.222*** 
Freedom house index -0.243*** -0.249*** -0.202*** 
population -0.478*** -0.504*** -0.422*** 
[Note] ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively under the test 
bilateral aid per capita and lagged export ratio are independent 
 
Of all self-interest motives of donors, commercial motives and political and strategic 
motives can be considered as principal components. Let us take a look for commercial 
motives first. Aid can be exploited as an instrument of export promotion. Szirmai (2005) 
                                                
19
 Spearman rank correlation is a measure of the strength of the associations between two variables. It can be 
used to give an R-estimate which is a robust estimation based on a rank test, and is a measure of monotone 
association that is used when the distribution of the data make Pearson's correlation coefficient undesirable or 
misleading (Wolfram 2007). Since Spearman rank correlation does not require interval scales and Freedom 
house index and population are discreet variables, it is plausible to adopt Spearman rank correlation. 
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asserts that aid can be used to support firms exporting to development countries, and to help 
new export markets. He further insists that sometimes the only motive is blatant self-interest, 
with firms in donor countries lobbying for aid functioning as a form of export credit in 
disguise. Sometimes there is a genuine conviction that the promotion of economic 
development in a developing country is compatible with an expansion of exports to this 
country. For this reason, I introduce, here, “export” which is expressed by a share of bilateral 
exports of a donor to recipients in the donor’s total export as a proxy for commercial motive. 
Nevertheless, if aid is tied, a simultaneity bias might arise as more tied will lead to more 
imports from the respective donor. Canavire et al (2005) also suggested that this problem can 
be mitigated by taking values of the variable that is lagged one year. Thus, I take the 
indicator with one year behind as he did in his study. If commercial motives do not exist 
behind the determination of aid, the expected sign for the coefficient of this variable would 
not be significantly positive. 
 
In addition to exports, imports from developing countries are also important for Japan. First, 
since Japan is resource poor country, Japan depends on foreign country to supply own 
energy resource consumption, and mineral resource consumption. Second, cheaper labours 
in developing countries are attractive for business in Japan such as manufacturing, 
automobile and so forth. As it was discussed above, Japan supports projects for economic 
infrastructures, especially in Far East Asia, through aid, and the consolidating infrastructure 
can consequently enable Japanese firms easier to engage in business there. Indeed, if we 
compare top ten importers from Japan and exporters to Japan by table 3-2, there are 4 
developing countries in top ten importers from Japan while there are 5 developing countries 
in top ten exporters from Japan. 
Table 3-2: Top ten trade partners of Japan; exporters and importers (2005) 
 Importers from Japan 
(Japan exports) 
exporters to Japan 
(Japan imports) 
1 United States China 
2 China United States 
3 Korea Saudi Arabia 
4 Chinese Taipei United Arab Emirates 
5 Hong Kong  Australia 
6 Thailand Korea 
7 Germany Indonesia 
8 Singapore Chinese Taipei 
9 United Kingdom Germany 
10 Netherlands Thailand 
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[Note] Source: OECD (2007) 
It suggests that imports from developing countries are also important commercial strategy 
for Japan. Thus, I introduce a share of bilateral imports of Japan from recipients in the 
Japan’s total import as another proxy for commercial motive. 
 
Another self-interest motive of donors, political and strategic motives, can be measured by 
political allegiance. Political allegiance can be influenced by historical tie and 
contemporaneous relationship. As we have discussed in above, Japan has emphasized 
relationship between Far East Asia from the initial stage of its annals of aid. To capture the 
additional impact on the area by other effects fixed, I use dummy variable which is set “one” 
for all recipients where are classified in Far East Asia by OECD (2007) sense. For other 
donors, colonial ties can explain historical tie between a donor and a certain recipient. Hence, 
I introduce colonial dummy variables for them. Since former colonial ties vary in donors, the 
variables which correspond with each of donors must be specified. With the reason that 
Norway has not colonized any recipient countries in the sample, this variable which 
corresponds with Norway is not introduced. Also even though Japan had colonized several 
countries before until of WWII, colonial dummy for Japan is not introduced since countries 
colonized by Japan are mostly in Far East Asia and it may incur multicollinearity. The 
variable is set equal to “one” for all recipients that were former colonies of corresponding 
donor countries. If self-interest motive is behind donors’ determination of allocation of aid, 
coefficient of this variable would be significantly positive. 
 
With regard to the study of Alesina and Dollar (2000) and others, I adopt UN voting pattern 
as a variable which explains contemporaneous political allegiance. UN voting pattern can be 
interpreted in two ways. Number one, some donors might want to use aid as a tool to buy 
UN votes in favour of their country. Number two, UN voting pattern correlates with alliance 
and similarity of economic and geopolitical interest. The study insisted the latter 
interpretation is plausible. Also the study concluded that Japanese aid allocation has positive 
relationship with this. Here, the affinity of nation index20 which Gartzke and Jo (2002) 
created to measure the interest similarity among pairs of all UN members is used. The index 
ranges from -1 to 1 with higher values indicating more similar voting patterns and all pairs of 
a certain donor and a certain recipient are available. This variable will be called “UN friend” 
                                                
20
 For further description of the indicator, see Gartzke and Jo(2002) 
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onwards. If donors’ determinations of aid allocation are distorted by such self-interests, the 
coefficient of this variable would be significantly positive. 
 
Some studies such as Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Gates and Hoeffler (2004) showed 
Egypt and Israel had been prone to receive more aid than other recipients due to political 
strategic reasons, especially from USA. Here, I take dummy variable for those recipients to 
control the effect. 
 
Aid allocation may be affected by decision makers. In order to test this hypothesis, I further 
control a variable which explains effect of change decision maker. Whether government 
party is right wing or left wing can capture the decision makers’ notion in broad sense. For 
this reason, I add a dummy variable for right wing as well. This variable is set “1” if 
government party is right wing at beginning of certain year. 
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4. Estimation Methodology 
4.1 Choice of Method 
The data include every country that has received aid from each donor in the period under the 
examination. It is unlikely to have all countries receive aid from every donor. Moreover, for 
some recipients, donors may not disburse definite aid for all years during the sample period 
as recipients may have grown enough to stop being recipient, or a deterioration of 
relationship, and so forth. Thus, the data likely contain zero bilateral aid flows and it renders 
the dependent variable partly continuous with positive probability mass at value zero. The 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model without treating the truncated nature of the dependent 
variable is inappropriate because OLS estimations depend on the assumption that the 
expected value of the dependent variable is linear in the independent variables, which is 
violated if the independent variable has positive probability mass at value zero. In my dataset, 
however, there are very few zeroes in the dependent variable, especially dataset for Japan, 
and therefore, results with and without treating the truncated nature likely differ only to a 
small extent. 21   Furthermore, my dataset is panel data and estimations from non-linear 
models estimated with fixed effects are typically inconsistent if the length of the panel is 
fixed due to an incidental parameter problem (Greene 2002). For those reasons, here, in line 
with Alesina and Dollar (2000), Dollar and Levin (2004), and Gates and Hoeffler (2004), I 
employ log-linear model. I substituted very small values, 0.0001 22 , for recipients not 
receiving any aid from a donor before taking logarithm in order to avoid missing values as 
Alesiana and Dollar (2000) and Dollar and Levin (2004) did. For double checking, I have 
estimated with Tobit model, a non-linear model which can treat truncated nature. The 
comparison given in section 6 showed the differences are negligible for the analysis of 
Japanese aid allocation. 
                                                
21Actual comparison between the results with and without treating the truncated nature is given in section 6. 
22
 The minimum value of strictly positive aid per capita in my dataset is 0.0001933, therefore, I adopted the 
threshold for zero value, 0.0001, which is smaller than the minimum value. 
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4.2 Choice of Model 
The aid budgets are likely to vary over time. Indeed, Lloyd et al (2001) found time plays a 
very important role in the allocation of aid; besides, the effects are likely to vary with donors. 
Hence, donor-yearly time effects ought to be taken into account in the estimation. Roughly 
speaking, there are at least two types of effects, fixed effects and random effects. A single 
approach cannot be applied to all estimations since their behaviours vary with each donor. In 
this context, this study will explore the most appropriate approach from either no-donor-
yearly effects, donor-yearly-fixed effects, or donor-yearly-random effects for each regression. 
Following describes detail of each of those approaches. 
 
I. No donor-yearly effects - OLS 
Pooled OLS without controlling donor-yearly effects. This approach is adopted in 
Alesina and Dollar (2000), and Gates and Hoeffler (2004). 
 
II. Fixed effects – OLS 
There are several strategies for estimating fixed effects model. The least squares 
dummy model which takes dummy variables as each donor-yearly effects is widely 
used because it is relatively easy to estimate and interpret substantively. The model, 
however, becomes problematic when there are a number of groups in panel data. Our 
sample period spans from 1990 to 2002, and our set of donor-yearly groups is 
somewhat large. It may lead an excessive parameter problem, therefore, we use another 
strategy, “the within effect model”. The within effect model does not use dummy 
variables, but uses deviations from group means. Let us consider following equation. 
 
tjititjitji XY ,,,,,,, εωβα +++=   (1) 
where i  stands for the donor, j  for the recipient and t  for the year. Y is the dependent 
variable, i.e. the amount of aid disbursement per capita, X  is the vector of the 
explanatory variables. α  is intercept and β  is the vector of the parameters associated 
with the regressors. ti ,ω  is donor-yearly effects and tji ,,ε  is disturbance term. 
 
The average of the function (1) within the group of donor-year is 
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titititi XY ,,,, εωβα +++=   (2) 
where tiY , , tiX , , and ti,ε  are averages of each variable within the group. This is 
known as “between-effects estimator”. Within estimator can be obtained by subtracting 
each side of the between-effects equation, (2) from equation (1). 
 
titititjititjititji XXYY ,,,,,,,,,,, ωωεεββαα −+−+−+−=−  
( ) titjititji XX ,,,,,, εεβ −+−=   (3) 
 
The estimation of a grand average, average of total observations, is added to (3). 
Namely, 
 
( ) ωεεεβ ++−++−=+− titjititjititji XXXYYY ,,,,,,,,,  
where Y , X , ε , and ω  are grand average of each variable 
 
Here, we assume ( ) 0
,,
=tjiE ε . 
( ) tjititjititji XXXYYY ,,,,,,,, ηβ ++−=+−  
where ωεεη +−= titjitji ,,,,,  
 
In order to justify adopting this approach, F-test, which tests whether the null 
hypothesis that all the fixed effects are collectively equal to zero, should be performed. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, we may conclude that the fixed effect model is better 
than the pooled OLS model. 
 
III. Random effects - GLS 
This approach treats donor-yearly effects as random variables. This approach, further, 
requires an assumption that donor-yearly effects are uncorrelated with explanatory 
variables.  
 
titjitjitji vuXY ,,,,,,, +++= βα   (4) 
where 
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tjiu ,, ～ ),0( 2uIID σ  and tiv , ～ ),0( 2vIID σ  
 
Then, error term for equation (3) can be expressed as one term. 
tjtjitji vuw ,,,,, +=  
 
From the assumption, tjiu ,, ～ ),0( 2uIID σ  and tiv , ～ ),0( 2vIID σ , we can say 
( ) 22
,,,,
,cov vutlitji ww σσ +=   for lj =  
                         
2
vσ=   for lj ≠  
( ) 22
,,,,
,cov vuslktji ww σσ +=   for lj ,∀  if ki ≠  or st ≠  
 
That implies errors tjiu ,,  and tiv ,  correlates within groups. Namely errors are 
heteroskedastic and estimates from OLS are likely to be biased. Kitamura (2002) 
suggests that the generalized least squared (GLS) can deal this problem and provide 
efficient estimates. 
 
GLS is performed in following way. 
First, we can obtain following variance-covariance matrix from above conditions, 
 
where T  denotes the number of approaches. 
If this matrix is known, you can derive 
22
2
1
vu
v
T σσ
σθ
+
−=
and proceed with the 
procedure in next paragraph. Nevertheless, in most of cases, the matrix is unknown, 
therefore, we have to estimate θ  by using 2ˆ uσ  and 2ˆ vσ  which are derived from the sum 
of squares due to error (SSE) of the within effect model23 or the deviation of residuals 
from group means of residuals (through the between effect model24). 
                                                
23
 See Park (2005) for detail of this method 
24
 See Park (2005) for detail of this method 
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Next, transform variables by using θˆ . 
θα
θ
θ
ˆ1
ˆ
ˆ
*
,,,,
*
,,
,,,,
*
,,
−=
−=
−=
tjitjitji
tjitjitji
XXX
YYY
 for all explanatory variables. 
Then we can obtain following equation and run OLS. 
*
,,
*
,,
***
,, tjitjitji XY εβα −+=  
 
The pooled OLS and fixed effects OLS are special version of this, when 0ˆ =θ  and 
1ˆ =θ
 respectively. 
 
In order to test validity of the estimation, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 
and Hausman test should be performed after the regression. The former tests whether 
random effect GLS is preferable to OLS. It tests the null hypothesis that the estimated 
variances of the residuals from a regression are not dependent on the values of the 
explanatory variables, namely, no heteroskedasticity in the model. If the null 
hypothesis, ( ) 0
,
=tjvVar , is rejected, random effect GLS is preferable to pooled OLS 
model. The latter tests whether random effects estimation would be almost as good as 
fixed effect estimation. If the null hypothesis that random effects would be consistent 
and efficient is not rejected, random effect model is justified to be used. If random 
effect GLS model produced biased estimators, the null hypothesis would be rejected. 
 
Since we have three measures for the estimation, we will adopt appropriate model for each 
regression based upon the procedure depicted in figure 4-1 for each regression. First, random 
effects GLS is performed, then Breusch-Pagan LM test is performed to test whether the 
random effects GLS is preferred to OLS. If null hypothesis for the test is rejected and 
random effects model is preferred, we go to left part in the phase “B” in that figure and we 
compare random effects model with fixed effects model. If not, we go right part of it and 
compare fixed effect model and OLS. In phase B, we perform fixed effects OLS, then apply 
F-test to test whether fixed effects model is preferred to OLS. If null hypothesis for the test is 
not rejected, we discard results from fixed effects OLS. That implies if we are in left side in 
29 
 
 
phase B, results from random effects GLS is concluded to be the most preferable estimation 
and if we are in right side, OLS is performed and the results is regarded as the most 
appropriate. In the case of that its null hypothesis is rejected and results from fixed effects 
OLS is preferred to OLS, if we are in the left side in phase “B”, Hausman test is performed 
to compare random effects GLS and fixed effects OLS and judge which results to adopt. If 
the test cannot reject null hypothesis, we adopt the results from random effects GLS and if it 
can, we adopt the results from fixed effects OLS. If we are in the right side in phase “B”, 
fixed effects OLS is performed and the results is regarded as the most appropriate. 
 
All calculations are executed using STATA version 9.0. 
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Figure 4-1 : Flow chart for opting model 
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5. Results 
5.1 Aggregated data 
We begin with regressions explaining aggregate bilateral aid flows for different periods. The 
data contains aid flows from all our sample donors, USA, Japan, France, UK, Germany, and 
Norway. 
 
Table 5-1:  Estimation results of aggregated data 
 1990-2002 1990-1996 1997-2002 
LN(GDP per capita) -1.174 
(-36.94)*** 
-1.255 
(-28.15)*** 
-1.083 
(-23.94)*** 
LN(population) -0.273 
(-11.43)*** 
-0.324 
(-9.81)*** 
-0.204 
(-5.93)*** 
LN(lagged exports) 0.420 
(21.19)*** 
0.442 
(16.06)*** 
0.392 
(13.73)*** 
Government -0.257 
(-14.5)*** 
-0.290 
(-11.43)*** 
-0.223 
(-9.03)*** 
UN Friend toward 
Donors 
1.670 
(12.22)*** 
1.130 
(5.57)*** 
2.229 
(12.18)*** 
Colonial dummy 1.383 
(13.97)*** 
1.630 
(11.45)*** 
1.116 
(8.19)*** 
Intercept 12.963 
(21.07)*** 
14.807 
(17.45)*** 
10.723 
(12.02)*** 
Observations 11584 6097 5487 
R-squared 0.156 0.162 0.155 
Breusch-Pagan LM test, 
P-value 
0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
F-test for collective 
fixed effect, P-value 
0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Hausman test,  P-value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.019 ** 
[Note] Dependent variable is natural log of  net ODA disbursement received from a certain donor per capita 
Method of estimation: Fixed effects OLS 
Fixed effects depends on both the year of observation and the donor 
“Breusch-Pagan LM test, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Breusch-Pagan LM test 
“F-test for collective fixed effect, P-value” represents P-value obtained from F-test the hypothesis that all the 
fixed effects are collectively equal zero 
 “Hausman, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Hausman test 
t statistics are reported in brackets 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively 
 
 
32 
 
 
The first column of table 5-1 reports the result of whole sample period, from 1990 to 2002. 
This time period allows us to analyze characteristics of the donors during this period when 
the end of cold war induced donors to change behaviours (Berthelemy and Tichit 2002). 
From this period, donors started being selective on political governance of recipients (Dollar 
and Levin 2004) because only in good policy environments will aid be growth enhancing. 
Table 1 also provided estimates for two separate periods, from 1990 to 1996 and from 1997 
to 2002 respectively, to test structural breaks over time in the parameters of the model. The 
procedure specified in figure 4-1 was adopted throughout. This is illustrated in table 5-1 for 
example on follows: looking at the first column, results of Breusch-Pagan LM test indicates 
the result of random effects GLS is preferred to OLS. Then, fixed effects OLS was 
performed and the results of F-test for collective fixed effects imply that the result is 
preferred to OLS. Since we are in the left side in phase “B” in figure 4-1, Hausman test was 
performed to test which model to adopt and the result implies result from fixed effects OLS 
ought to be adopted. 
 
First, let us see the result from whole sample period. All estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant. Most of estimated signs of coefficients are in line with what we have 
expected above. Negative sign for the coefficient of income, natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita, implies that donors are poverty focused. The relationship between natural logarithm 
of recipients’ population and aid flow indicates that small countries receives higher amount 
of aid per capita. The positive sign for the coefficient of natural logarithm of lagged export 
share, proxy of donors’ commercial motives, suggests commercial motive is behind aid 
allocation at certain extent. To capture whether the behaviour of the donor is driven by well 
governed recipients, the variable “government”, measure of political rights and civil liberties, 
is introduced in the regression. The negative sign for the coefficient supports prevalence of 
policy selective behaviour among donors. Since the pattern of UN votes strongly correlates 
with alliances and similarity of economic and geopolitical interest (Alesina and Dollar 2000), 
UN vote pattern, named as “UN friend” in the regression, was introduced to capture political 
motives on the aid flow. My result, its positive sign, shows its positive relationship with aid 
flows. Colonial dummy variable is introduced to capture influence of historical tie on their 
aid decision and its positive sign implies donors prefer recipients with historical ties to those 
without them. 
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If we compare the results for the period 1990-1996 and the period 1997-2002, all the 
regressors maintain the same sign and significance. However, we can see notable 
transformations of magnitude for some regressors over the periods. Smaller coefficients for 
GDP per capita and government in the latter period confirm that donors have been less 
poverty focused and less policy focused. Namely humanitarian aid giving behaviour has 
been weakened over time in collective donors’ behaviour. Nevertheless, some of the selfish 
motives have also been weakened over time. Commercial motive and historical tie have 
become less important. However, the motive from geopolitical interests has been increased 
over time. 
5.2 All Sample donors for period 1990-2002 
In order to fully capture the differences in the aid allocation process among individual 
sample donors, I ran separate regressions for each donor. The result of estimation for all 
sample donors for period from 1990 to 2002 is reported in table 5-2 to compare Japanese aid 
allocative behaviour with other major donors and Norway as a proxy of reputed as 
humanitarian donor. 
 
First, let us look at altruistic terms. The per capita GDP has, as expected, a significantly 
negative impact on aid allocation among all sample donors. All sample donors are poverty 
selective. But Japan is relatively less poverty focused than the other donors. Japan is the 
third least after Germany and France. That of USA, UK, and Norway is far above. All 
sample donors are policy selective. Japan is relatively policy focused in line with previous 
studies. USA, UK and Japan are the most policy selective whereas France, Germany, and 
Norway are far below than them. The regressor for Norway is not even relevant. 
 
The results indicate selfish motives are behind all donors’ aid allocation. Japanese aid 
allocation is distorted by commercial motives but neither political motives nor historical ties. 
Both export and import significantly influence Japanese aid allocation. The magnitude, 
however, is not very large. That is larger in France, UK, and USA. It contrasts with the 
finding of Canavire et al (2005). As we have expected, if Japan imports more, the recipient 
receives more aid. If we see the political motives, contrary to our expectation and other 
empirical studies such as Alesina and Dollar (2000), Gates and Hoeffler (2004), and so forth,  
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Table 5-2:  Estimation results for all sample donors, 1990-2002 
 
Japan 
(random) 
USA 
(random) 
France 
(OLS) 
UK  
(OLS) 
Germany 
(fixed) 
Norway 
(fixed) 
LN(GDP per capita) -0.972 
(-16.2)*** 
-1.722 
(-17.34)*** 
-0.953 
(-15.37)*** 
-1.415 
(-15.39)*** 
-0.779 
(-11.7)*** 
-1.375 
(-18.43)*** 
LN(population) -0.811 
(-18.93)*** 
-0.085 
(-1.20) 
-0.825 
(-16.5)*** 
-0.246 
(-3.66)*** 
-0.081 
(-1.44) 
0.322 
(6.02)*** 
LN(lagged exports) 0.309 
(7.88)*** 
0.371 
(6.42)*** 
0.910 
(21.86)*** 
0.622 
(9.33)*** 
0.278 
(6.05)*** 
0.114 
(2.73)*** 
LN(imports) 0.187 
(6.66)*** 
- - - - - 
Government -0.419 
(-12.61)*** 
-0.544 
(-9.18)*** 
-0.076 
(-2.26)** 
-0.538 
(-12.39)*** 
-0.112 
(-3.62)*** 
-0.068 
(-1.52) 
UN Friend -0.178 
(-0.52) 
1.704 
(5.79)*** 
0.520 
(1.75)* 
1.760 
(4.85)*** 
1.442 
(4.59)*** 
2.547 
(5.42)*** 
Far East Asia Dummy 0.191 
(0.83) 
- - - - - 
Own colonial Dummy - 1.508 
(4.23)*** 
1.771 
(11.17)*** 
1.443 
(8.59)*** 
0.363 
(2.11)** 
- 
Egypt 1.955 
(2.91)*** 
3.950 
(3.57)*** 
1.550 
(2.29)** 
-1.017 
(-1.13) 
0.726 
(1.17) 
-1.232 
(-1.39) 
Israel -2.521 
(-3.65)*** 
7.203 
(6.30)*** 
0.435 
(0.63) 
-5.023 
(-5.56)*** 
3.402 
(3.05)*** 
-0.126 
(-0.14) 
Right Wing Dummy 0.044 
(0.36) 
-0.049 
(-0.18) 
0.066 
(0.59) 
0.650 
(4.31)*** 
- - 
Intercept 23.598 
(21.36)*** 
15.757 
(8.87)*** 
22.082 
(17.07)*** 
14.555 
(7.91)*** 
7.192 
(4.83)*** 
0.096 
(0.07) 
Observations 1927 1828 1944 1960 1900 1925 
R-squared 0.267 0.246 0.350 0.216 0.159 0.305 
Breusch-Pagan LM 
test, P-value 
0.072 * 0.000 *** 0.336 0.449 0.027 ** 0.000 *** 
F-test for collective 
fixed effects, P-value 
0.033 ** 0.000 *** 0.764 0.648 0.008 *** 0.000 *** 
Hausman test, P-value 0.650 0.158 - - 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
[Note] Dependent variable is natural log of  net ODA disbursement received from a certain donor per capita 
Method of estimation: shown in parenthesis below the title of regression(“random” represents random effects 
GLS,  “fixed” represents fixed effects OLS, and “OLS” represents OLS) 
Both random effects and fixed effects depend on the year of observation 
“Breusch-Pagan LM test, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Breusch-Pagan LM test 
“F-test for collective fixed effects, P-value” represents P-value obtained from F-test the hypothesis that all the 
fixed effects are collectively equal zero 
 “Hausman, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Hausman test 
t statistics are reported in brackets 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively 
“Right Wing Dummy” is dropped in the regression of Germany and Norway in order to avoid the estimation from 
being inconsistent because the variable can be interpreted as yearly effects in certain years 
35 
 
 
Japanese aid allocation is not driven by either geopolitical motives or historical ties. The 
pattern of UN votes does not give positive impact on Japanese aid allocation and it even  
gives negative impact. Nevertheless, the impact is not statistically significant. If we compare 
with other sample donors, the pattern of UN votes has positive impact on all other sample 
donors at statistically significant level. Surprisingly, that of Norway is prominently high. UK 
and USA follow after Norway. The coefficient for Far East Asia dummy variable is positive, 
but the effect is not statistically significant contrary to our expectation. On the other hand, 
aid allocation of other donors, USA, France, UK, and Germany, are distorted by historical 
ties at statistically significant level. 
 
The pattern of additional reward to Egypt and Israel varies with sample donors. Japan gives 
additional aid to Egypt while the impact on Israel is negative at statistically significant level. 
The impact on Egypt is quite large, the second largest after USA. As we have expected, USA 
gives positive reward to both Egypt and Israel. Each impact is the highest among all sample 
donors. France rewards Egypt while not Israel. On the other hand, Germany rewards in 
opposite pattern, rewards to Israel but not to Egypt. Both UK and Norway do not give 
additional aid to those countries. 
 
Whether that donor is governed by right wing party explains the aid allocation is not 
significant factor in most of sample donors including Japan. It can explain only in the 
regression of UK. If UK is governed by right wing political party, recipients receive more 
aid with all other factors fixed. The coefficients for the variable are not reported in the 
regression of Germany and Norway because they are estimated by fixed effect model with 
yearly fixed effects. Since it can be interpreted the variable as yearly fixed effects in certain 
years, they were dropped in order to avoid from the estimation biased. 
 
Summing up, Japanese aid allocation is explained by both altruistic and selfish motives. 
Japan is poverty selective and policy selective, but poverty selectivity is relatively weak. 
Japanese aid allocation is driven by commercial motives but not by political motives. 
Notwithstanding, if there are trend breaks within the period, findings here are not consistent. 
For this reason, I will have analysis with separation in the period; one is from 1990 to 1996 
and the other one is from 1997 to 2002. 
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5.3 All sample donors for period 1990-1996 and 1997-2002 
As we have done in 5.1, here, we investigate structural transformation of factors affecting 
aid allocation over time for individual donors. I separated the sample period into two periods, 
1990 to 1996 and 1997 and 2002 in line with section 5.1. Year 1997 is the turning point for 
Japanese aid allocation because of the East Asian financial crisis. Financial crisis in the 
region where is important for Japan both in terms of economic and politics was influential 
incident for Japanese aid allocation. Indeed, the MOFA proclaimed to utilize aid for the 
recovery from the crisis and as we can see from figure 2-3, there is an abrupt rise of share in 
Far East Asia since 1997. The estimation results are reported in table 5-3. 
 
All donors have been less poverty focused over time as we have seen in the result of 
aggregate data. In spite of the decline, all donors are still poverty focused. The decrease in 
US, UK, Germany, and Norway is quite small while that in Japan and France is considerable. 
On the other hand, Japan became more policy focused. The transition of policy selectivity 
varies with donors. USA became more policy selective whereas UK became less and the 
impact of policy selectivity of other donors, France, Germany, and Norway, is not 
statistically significant in the latter period. 
 
The transition of commercial motives also varies with donors. The bias from commercial 
motives on their aid allocation becomes weaker in Japan and France while it was enhanced 
in USA, UK, and Germany. That in Norway is not significant factor anymore in the latter 
period, i.e. commercial motives cannot explain Norwegian aid allocation in the latter period. 
However, its extent in France is still the highest among all sample donors. Despite the 
decline, Japanese aid allocation is still distorted by commercial motives at statistically 
significant level. 
 
If we see the factors of political motives, it is enhanced over time in Japanese aid allocation. 
The negative impact of UN vote pattern on Japanese aid allocation becomes a significantly 
positive impact in the latter period. Furthermore, Far East Asia dummy had abrupt rise from 
negative impact to positive impact. Among all sample donors, Japan and USA are the only 
donors which both geopolitical ties and historical ties are enhanced over time. The impact of 
UN vote pattern in UK had a considerable increase whereas the impact of historical ties was  
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Table 5-3: Estimation results for all sample donors, 1990-1996 and 1997-2002 
(a) Japan, USA, and France 
 Japan USA France 
 1990-1996 
(OLS) 
1997-2002 
(OLS) 
1990-1996 
(OLS) 
1997-2002 
(fixed) 
1990-1996 
(OLS) 
1997-2002 
(OLS) 
LN(GDP per capita) -1.153 
(-13.87)*** 
-0.813 
(-9.56)*** 
-1.759 
(-11.9)*** 
-1.743 
(-14.22)*** 
-1.174 
(-13.28)*** 
-0.681 
(-7.96)*** 
LN(population) -0.910 
(-15.19)*** 
-0.720 
(-11.88)*** 
0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.260 
(-2.93)*** 
-0.912 
(-13.04)*** 
-0.699 
(-9.90)*** 
LN(lagged exports) 0.417 
(7.65)*** 
0.209 
(3.75)*** 
0.392 
(4.75)*** 
0.410 
(5.40)*** 
1.016 
(17.08)*** 
0.772 
(13.45)*** 
LN(imports) 0.258 
(6.46)*** 
0.126 
(3.29)*** 
- - -  
Government -0.393 
(-8.50)*** 
-0.436 
(-9.35)*** 
-0.418 
(-4.63)*** 
-0.656 
(-9.28)*** 
-0.104 
(-2.15)** 
-0.056 
(-1.23) 
UN Friend -1.827 
(-3.75)*** 
1.353 
(2.91)*** 
1.681 
(3.89)*** 
1.956 
(5.67)*** 
0.478 
(1.15) 
0.421 
(1.00) 
Far East Asia Dummy -0.283 
(-0.88) 
0.629 
(1.96)* 
- - - - 
Own colonial Dummy - - 0.703 
(1.29) 
2.125 
(5.03)*** 
1.781 
(7.85)*** 
1.763 
(8.09)*** 
Egypt 2.287 
(2.45)** 
1.571 
(1.68)* 
3.860 
(2.30)** 
4.044 
(3.06)*** 
1.322 
(1.36) 
1.762 
(1.90)* 
Israel -2.027 
(-2.13)** 
-2.861 
(-2.94)*** 
8.153 
(4.73)*** 
5.871 
(4.29)*** 
1.417 
(1.44) 
-0.763 
(-0.81) 
Intercept 28.358 
(18.65)*** 
19.269 
(12.28)*** 
13.904 
(5.42)*** 
19.612 
(8.72)*** 
25.544 
(14.02)*** 
17.698 
(9.69)*** 
Observations 1019 908 978 850 1032 910 
R-squared 0.290 0.280 0.204 0.340 0.382 0.311 
Breusch-Pagan LM test, 
P-value 
0.513 0.213 0.157 0.000 *** 0.356 0.577 
F-test for collective 
fixed effects, P-value 
0.162 0.886 0.950 0.000 *** 0.708 0.543 
Hausman test,  P-value - - - 0.000 *** - - 
[Note] Dependent variable is natural log of  net ODA disbursement received from a certain donor per capita 
Method of estimation: shown in parenthesis below the title of regression(“fixed” represents fixed effects OLS, 
and “OLS” represents OLS) 
Fixed effects depend on the year of observation 
“Breusch-Pagan LM test, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Breusch-Pagan LM test 
“F-test for collective fixed effects, P-value” represents P-value obtained from F-test the hypothesis that all the 
fixed effects are collectively equal zero 
 “Hausman, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Hausman test 
t statistics are reported in brackets 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively 
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(b) UK, Germany, and Norway 
 UK Germany Norway 
 1990-1996 
(OLS) 
1997-2002 
(OLS) 
1990-1996  
(fixed) 
1997-2002 
(OLS) 
1990-1996 
(OLS) 
1997-2002 
(OLS) 
LN(GDP per capita) -1.416 
(-12.04)*** 
-1.358 
(-9.86)*** 
-0.831 
(-9.01)*** 
-0.729 
(-7.75)*** 
-1.413 
(-13.51)*** 
-1.284 
(-11.97)*** 
LN(population) -0.355 
(-4.17)*** 
-0.058 
(-0.57) 
-0.212 
(-2.71)*** 
0.063 
(0.80) 
0.306 
(4.13)*** 
0.380 
(4.91)*** 
LN(lagged exports) 0.488 
(5.62)*** 
0.683 
(6.92)*** 
0.261 
(3.99)*** 
0.298 
(4.72)*** 
0.141 
(2.47)** 
0.057 
(0.92) 
LN(lagged imports) - - - - - - 
Government -0.677 
(-12.12)*** 
-0.360 
(-5.58)*** 
-0.145 
(-3.35)*** 
-0.070 
(-1.62) 
-0.134 
(-2.11)** 
-0.022 
(-0.35) 
UN Friend 1.030 
(2.30)** 
3.319 
(5.75)*** 
1.531 
(3.46)*** 
1.750 
(4.02)*** 
2.484 
(3.35)*** 
2.215 
(3.77)*** 
Far East Asia Dummy - - - - - - 
Own colonial Dummy 1.859 
(8.44)*** 
1.098 
(4.48)*** 
0.572 
(2.32)** 
0.169 
(0.73) 
- - 
Egypt -0.623 
(-0.55) 
-1.462 
(-1.08) 
1.293 
(1.50) 
0.080 
(0.09) 
-0.922 
(-0.73) 
-1.612 
(-1.29) 
Israel -4.442 
(-3.87)*** 
-5.255 
(-3.86)*** 
3.569 
(3.12)*** 
- 1.272 
(0.98) 
-2.037 
(-1.59) 
Intercept 17.259 
(7.49)*** 
9.947 
(3.58)*** 
9.719 
(4.70)*** 
4.143 
(1.96)** 
0.663 
(0.33) 
-1.259 
(-0.62) 
Observations 1013 947 1006 894 998 927 
R-squared 0.560 0.215 0.135 0.234 0.280 0.322 
Breusch-Pagan LM test, 
P-value 
0.427 0.124 0.028 ** 0.239 0.807 0.539 
F-test for collective 
fixed effects, P-value 
0.672 0.984 0.008*** 0.858 0.250 0.139 
Hausman test, P-value - - 0.096 * - - - 
[Note] Dependent variable is natural log of  net ODA disbursement received from a certain donor per capita 
Method of estimation: shown in parenthesis below the title of regression(“fixed” represents fixed effects OLS, 
and “OLS” represents OLS) 
Fixed effects depend on the year of observation 
“Breusch-Pagan LM test, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Breusch-Pagan LM test 
“F-test for collective fixed effects, P-value” represents P-value obtained from F-test the hypothesis that all the 
fixed effects are collectively equal zero 
 “Hausman, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Hausman test 
t statistics are reported in brackets 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively 
“Israel” is dropped in the regression of Germany for the period 1997-2002 because there were no positive aid 
giving to the country in the period 
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weakened. Germany made similar pattern but the increase in UN vote pattern is not 
considerably large. Both impacts in France are almost stable and UN vote pattern in Norway 
was slightly declined. 
 
Japan has given less reward toward Egypt with other factors fixed over time and the negative 
reward toward Israel with other factors fixed also has been swelled over time. The reward 
toward Israel from USA has also declined whereas the reward toward Egypt has been 
enhanced over time. The reward from UK to Israel has been declined, too. The reward 
toward Egypt from France became positively significant in the latter period. Germany 
rewarded Israel in the former period, however, the variable is dropped in the latter period 
because Germany does not give positive aid due to the repayments of loan. All that means 
Israel cannot be considered as an aid recipient for most of donors in the latter period. 
 
During this sample period, Japan has less valued recipients’ income whereas stressed policy 
selectivity. For selfish terms, Japanese commercial motive has been weakened whereas 
political motives seem to be strengthened. For regional distribution, the reward toward 
recipients in Far East Asia is strengthened as we have expected while that toward Egypt was 
weakened. 
5.4 Comparison of Japanese aid allocation with Far East 
Asia and the others 
As we have seen above, Far East Asia is the destination with special interest for Japan. 
Indeed, Japanese government recognizes that the there are manifold stakes such as economic 
and security ties with the region. Sub-section 5.3 revealed Japanese aid rewards the region 
more over time. This sub-section investigates whether the patterns we have seen can be 
upheld if we distinguish the region and analyze in same way. The results are reported in 
table 5-4. 
 
First, let us take a look on results for overall period. Altruistic terms influence aid allocation 
positively in both regions, but the patterns are different over the regions. Japan is more 
poverty focused in Far East Asia, but is less policy focused in the area. Selfish terms also 
show different pattern over regions. If we see the coefficient of lagged export, it is  
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Table 5-4:  Comparison between Far East Asia and other regions 
 Far East Asia Other regions 
 1990-2002 
(random) 
1990-1996 
(random) 
1997-2002 
(random) 
1990-2002 
(random) 
1990-1996 
(OLS) 
1997-2002 
(OLS) 
LN(GDP per capita) -1.009 
(-1.52) 
-2.655 
(-2.87)*** 
0.338 
(0.33) 
-0.981 
(-16.67)*** 
-1.149 
(-14.02)*** 
-0.836 
(-10.18)*** 
LN(population) -0.205 
(-0.43) 
-1.368 
(-2.09)** 
0.820 
(1.09) 
-0.823 
(-19.56)*** 
-0.900 
(-15.22)*** 
-0.753 
(-12.84)*** 
LN(lagged exports) 1.036 
(2.58)*** 
1.728 
(2.92)*** 
0.311 
(0.53) 
0.278 
(7.11)*** 
0.387 
(7.10)*** 
0.183 
(3.33)*** 
LN(imports) -0.629 
(-2.34)** 
-0.177 
(-0.38) 
-0.854 
(-2.43)** 
0.192 
(6.96)*** 
0.257 
(6.54)*** 
0.136 
(3.68)*** 
Government -0.874 
(-5.44)*** 
-0.843 
(-3.73)*** 
-0.872 
(-3.74)*** 
-0.369 
(-11.05)*** 
-0.340 
(-7.33)*** 
-0.385 
(-8.32)*** 
UN Friend 4.287 
(2.57)*** 
4.536 
(2.10)** 
6.475 
(2.32)** 
-0.256 
(-0.76) 
-2.180 
(-4.46)*** 
1.450 
(3.24)*** 
Right Wing Dummy -0.035 
(-0.07) 
- - 0.061 
(0.52) 
- - 
Intercept 12.299 
(0.93) 
44.430 
(2.51)** 
-17.623 
(-0.84) 
23.573 
(21.81)*** 
28.149 
(18.83)*** 
19.587 
(12.93)*** 
Observations 146 78 68 1781 941 840 
R-squared 0.327 0.395 0.327 0.273 0.301 0.294 
Breusch-Pagan LM test, 
P-value 
0.010 ** 0.062 * 0.097 * 0.027 ** 0.462 0.327 
F-test for collective 
fixed effects, P-value 
1.000 0.999 0.995 0.018 ** 0.150 0.754 
Hausman test, P-value - - - 0.376 - - 
[Note] Dependent variable is natural log of  net ODA disbursement received from a certain donor per capita 
Method of estimation: shown in parenthesis below the title of regression(“random” represents random effects 
GLS,  “fixed” represents fixed effects OLS, and “OLS” represents OLS) 
Both random effects and fixed effects depend on the year of observation 
“Breusch-Pagan LM test, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Breusch-Pagan LM test 
“F-test for collective fixed effects, P-value” represents P-value obtained from F-test the hypothesis that all the 
fixed effects are collectively equal zero 
 “Hausman, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Hausman test 
t statistics are reported in brackets 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively 
 
statistically significant in both regions and it is much larger in Far East Asia, almost three 
times higher. The magnitude is even higher than for France for whose the coefficient is the 
largest among all sample donors in same period. But imports do not explain in regression of 
Far East Asia whereas it explains in regression of other regions. That implies that aid may be 
exploited to have sustainable energy supply. The UN vote pattern does not explain in other 
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regions while it is relevant in Far East Asia. Whether government party is right wing or not 
is not significant factor in both regions. 
 
If we see the transition over time, we can find drastic changes in Far East Asia. The impact 
on poverty selectivity is considerably large, and the extent is much larger than any other 
donors that we have seen above in the earlier periods, while it is not statistically significant 
anymore in latter period. The magnitude of policy selectivity is almost constant over time. 
Commercial motives have been weakened over time. Export used to be a positive factor at 
statistically significant level in the earlier period while it is not statistically significant 
anymore in the latter period. Import has not given positive impact in both periods. On the 
other hand, the pattern of UN vote has been enhanced over time. The impact is dramatically 
large comparing to other donors. 
 
The pattern toward the other regions does not exhibit drastic change. Japan has been less 
poverty selective over time. Policy selectivity has been almost constant over time. 
Commercial motives have been weakened. The coefficient for both lagged export and lagged 
import are decreased in latter period. Besides, as we can see from the coefficient of UN 
Friend, distortion from political motives has been also weakened. 
 
As we have expected, the pattern of Japanese aid allocation differs with regions. According 
to the result, Japanese aid allocation to Far East Asia is more altruistic than that to the other 
regions. On the other hand, that to Far East Asia is driven by more selfish motives. Besides, 
geopolitical motive is enhanced over time in Far East Asia while commercial motive has 
been weakened over time. Most of selfish motives in the other regions are not as strong as 
that in Far East Asia. 
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6. Robustness Checks 
In this section we examine the robustness of results of our examination above. First, we will 
investigate the possibility of other factors which may influence Japanese aid allocation. One 
special factor is Japanese relationship with USA. It may diverge from original intension of 
Japanese aid policies. The first subsection explores the possibility. In the next subsection, we 
will confirm whether our results are consistent because we estimated without treating non-
linearity. We will compare results above with results from an alternative method Tobit 
model for double checking. 
6.1 Influence of US pressure on Japanese aid decision 
6.1.1 Propounding the problem 
If we consider Japanese foreign policies, the leverage of USA’s foreign policies over 
Japanese policies must be taken into account. Orr (1990) and Miyashita (1999) argued that 
Japan is highly sensitive to USA reaction to its foreign aid policy, and it often changes the 
course of action under explicit or tacit pressure from USA, since Japan has strong desire to 
avoid a major disruption in bilateral relationship with USA. If such pressure from USA alters 
the Japanese foreign aid policy, it has to be controlled in our estimations. 
 
Miyashita argued that Japan’s responsiveness to USA pressures stems in large part from the 
asymmetry of interdependence25 between two countries. Japan is more dependent on the 
USA than vice versa because of two crucial commodities: export market and security. 
 
As shown in figure 6-1, Japan has been more dependent on USA than USA on Japan for 
export market. For all years in the period, the share of USA in Japan’s total exports has 
accounted for more than twice of the share of Japan in USA’s total exports. The significance 
of Japan’s dependence on the USA market can be shown in another comparative context. 
Countries that pursue more independent policy of USA pressure, for instance France and 
Germany, account for lesser degree of dependence on the USA market. In 2005, USA 
                                                
25
 The term ”dependence” is used in this study to refer to reliance of a country on another for goods and 
services and will be distinguished from ”dependency”. 
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accounted for share of France’s and Germany’s total exports 7.17% and 8.88% respectively. 
Furthermore, industries highly depend on foreign sales such as manufacture high technology 
and capital intensive products are important part of Japanese economy and employ 20 
percent of Japanese labour force (Miyashita 2003). There are no other foreign market which 
are capable of absorbing Japan’s high technology and capital intensive products as  much as 
USA. Those facts imply that the cost of terminating the bilateral trade is higher for Japan 
than for USA. 
 
Under the USA–Japan security treaty, USA is obliged to defend Japan when the latter is 
under attack, while Japan has no reciprocal obligation. In addition to providing military 
protection against potential external threat, the bilateral security treaty allowed postwar 
Japan to stay lightly armed while putting efforts and resources into economic recovery from 
the devastation of World War II. Disruption of the treaty is tremendously costly for Japan 
because there is no alternative to USA as the provider of security to Japan and own 
remilitarization is foreseeable to have strong domestic and international opposition. 
 
Figure 6-1: Flow chart for opting model 
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Hence, given the fact that Japan depends on USA more than USA depends on Japan for trade 
and security, and availability for substitute providers is much more limited for Japan than for 
the USA, the USA has substantial bargaining leverage over Japan. Miyashita (2003), indeed, 
found out several cases where Japanese foreign aid policies were altered due to the pressure 
from USA. Type 2 and type 5 in table 6-1 are indicative. 
 
Table 6-1: Types of Japanese interests and USA pressure 
 USA pressure 
 To start/increase aid To suspend aid 
Strong interests in 
giving aid 
Type 1 
“Confluence of interests” 
 
South Korea (1983) 
Thailand (1978-80) 
Philippines (1988) 
Egypt (1977-82) 
Type 2 
“Conflict of interests” 
 
China (1989) 
Iran (1994-99) 
Vietnam (1990-92) 
No/weak interests 
in either giving or 
not giving aid 
Type 3 
“Neither confluent nor conflictive” 
 
Pakistan (1982) 
Jamaica (1981/83) 
Carribean Basin (1982) 
Sudan (1982) 
Type 4 
“Neither confluent nor conflictive” 
 
Haiti (1991) 
Nigeria (1994) 
Sudan (1992) 
Kenya (1991) 
Japanese 
interests 
Strong interests in 
not giving aid 
Type 5 
“Conflict of interests” 
 
Russia (1991-93) 
North Korea (after 1994) 
Type 6 
“Confluence of interests” 
 
Russia (before 1991) 
North Korea (before1994) 
[Note]Source: Miyashita (2003) 
 
The finding implies that the variables employed in the estimation above do not explain all 
factors which influence Japanese aid allocation. Notwithstanding, plausible variable for 
controlling it has not been discovered yet. But if we still include the data for the aid flow 
which was generated on contrary to Japanese interest, we cannot analyze sheer Japanese 
interest. The estimation would be likely biased. Thus, here, I would omit the data which is 
altered due to the USA pressure and estimate again with the corrected dataset. 
 
6.1.2 Result 
Table 6-2 (a) depicts estimation results of Japan for all recipients with three periods, 1990 – 
2002, 1990 – 1996, and 1997 – 2002 respectively. Comparing the results with that in section  
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Table 6-2:  Corrected estimation results for Japan 
(a) all recipients 
 
1990-2002 
(random) 
1990-1996 
(OLS) 
1997-2002 
(OLS) 
LN(GDP per capita) -0.971 
(-16.93)*** 
-1.144 
(-14.28)*** 
-0.829 
(-10.34)*** 
LN(population) -0.814 
(-19.87)*** 
-0.904 
(-15.63)*** 
-0.740 
(-12.96)*** 
LN(lagged exports) 0.291 
(7.77)*** 
0.397 
(7.55)*** 
0.198 
(3.77)*** 
LN(imports) 0.189 
(7.03)*** 
0.263 
(6.82)*** 
0.125 
(3.48)*** 
Government -0.388 
(-12.15)*** 
-0.368 
(-8.24)*** 
-0.394 
(-8.92)*** 
UN Friend -0.183 
(-0.56) 
-1.853 
(-3.95)*** 
1.388 
(3.17)*** 
Far East Asia Dummy 0.991 
(4.31)*** 
0.394 
(1.22) 
1.552 
(4.94)*** 
Egypt 1.956 
(3.04)*** 
2.271 
(2.53)** 
1.585 
(1.79)* 
Israel -2.417 
(-3.66)*** 
-1.981 
(-2.17)** 
-2.670 
(-2.91)*** 
Right Wing Dummy 0.047 
(0.42) 
- - 
Intercept 23.452 
(22.22)*** 
28.072 
(19.16)*** 
19.447 
(13.16)*** 
Observations 1905 1006 899 
R-squared 0.286 0.306 0.309 
Breusch-Pagan LM 
test, P-value 
0.036 ** 0.493 0.240 
F-test for collective 
fixed effects, P-value 
0.020 ** 0.154 0.851 
Hausman test, P-value 0.299 - - 
[Note] Dependent variable is natural log of  net ODA disbursement received from a certain donor per capita 
Method of estimation: shown in parenthesis below the title of regression(“random” represents random effects 
GLS,  “fixed” represents fixed effects OLS, and “OLS” represents OLS) 
Both random effects and fixed effects depend on the year of observation 
“Breusch-Pagan LM test, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Breusch-Pagan LM test 
“F-test for collective fixed effects, P-value” represents P-value obtained from F-test the hypothesis that all the 
fixed effects are collectively equal zero 
 “Hausman, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Hausman test 
t statistics are reported in brackets 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively 
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 (b)  Far East Asia and other regions 
 Far East Asia Other regions 
 1990-2002 
(OLS) 
1990-1996 
(OLS) 
1997-2002 
(OLS) 
1990-2002 
(random) 
1990-1996 
(OLS) 
1997-2002 
(OLS) 
LN(GDP per capita) -1.752 
(-4.58)*** 
-2.476 
(-4.07)*** 
-1.844 
(-5.08)*** 
-0.978 
(-16.65)*** 
-1.142 
(-13.97)*** 
-0.837 
(-10.18)*** 
LN(population) -0.872 
(-3.19)*** 
-1.559 
(-3.62)*** 
-0.730 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.818 
(-19.46)*** 
-0.890 
(-15.06)*** 
-0.753 
(-12.84)*** 
LN(lagged exports) 1.245 
(5.35)*** 
1.279 
(3.22)*** 
1.274 
(6.08)*** 
0.279 
(7.14)*** 
0.389 
(7.17)*** 
0.181 
(3.30)*** 
LN(imports) -0.424 
(-2.76)*** 
0.208 
(0.65) 
-0.610 
(-5.19)*** 
0.191 
(6.94)*** 
0.257 
(6.56)*** 
0.134 
(3.61)*** 
Government -0.325 
(-3.38)*** 
-0.401 
(-2.56)** 
-0.102 
(-1.19) 
-0.374 
(-11.2)*** 
-0.346 
(-7.47)*** 
-0.389 
(-8.38)*** 
UN Friend 3.513 
(3.73)*** 
4.368 
(3.06)*** 
3.973 
(4.19)*** 
-0.230 
(-0.68) 
-2.158 
(-4.43)*** 
1.457 
(3.26)*** 
Right Wing Dummy -0.027 
(-0.09) 
- - 0.076 
(0.64) 
- - 
Intercept 27.991 
(3.71)*** 
44.843 
(3.85)*** 
24.825 
(3.33)*** 
23.473 
(21.74)*** 
27.968 
(18.75)*** 
19.584 
(12.92)*** 
Observations 132 70 62 1773 936 837 
R-squared 0.414 0.392 0.716 0.273 0.300 0.295 
Breusch-Pagan LM test, 
P-value 
0.291 0.145 0.317 0.051 * 0.608 0.333 
F-test for collective 
fixed effects, P-value 
0.873 0.956 0.731 0.027 ** 0.197 0.746 
Hausman test, P-value - - - 0.625 - - 
[Note] Dependent variable is natural log of  net ODA disbursement received from a certain donor per capita 
Method of estimation: shown in parenthesis below the title of regression(“random” represents random effects 
GLS,  “fixed” represents fixed effects OLS, and “OLS” represents OLS) 
Both random effects and fixed effects depend on the year of observation 
“Breusch-Pagan LM test, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Breusch-Pagan LM test 
“F-test for collective fixed effect, P-value” represents P-value obtained from F-test the hypothesis that all the 
fixed effects are collectively equal zero 
 “Hausman, P-value” represents P-value obtained from Hausman test 
t statistics are reported in brackets 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively 
 
5, most of the results are almost maintained except impact of Far East Asia dummy. The 
variable turns to be positively significant, confirming Japan’s preference to the region as we 
have expected. But the magnitude is not relatively large. The magnitude of historical tie in 
USA, France, and UK is much larger. The results from the comparative analysis of the two 
periods are also maintained the same sign and almost the same level of significance except 
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the Far East Asia dummy. The positive impact in the latter period increases to more than 
twice as large as that in the analysis from pre-corrected dataset. The impact in the former 
period, despite the insignificance, turns from negative to positive. 
 
Table 6-2 (b) in appendix depicts the results with different regions, Far East Asia and the 
others, and with the three periods. The notable changes can be seen only in the results for Far 
East Asia. Let us take a look the whole period first. Comparing to the previous result, 
poverty selectivity is strengthened and policy selectivity is weakened. Overall change in 
selfish motives is ambiguous, too. The impact on exports strengthens while the effect on UN 
vote pattern declines. For the former period, the impact on both altruistic terms, poverty 
selectivity and policy selectivity, are weakened while commercial motives are also weakened. 
The coefficient for exports declines without losing significance. The change in impact on 
UN vote pattern is subtle. We see drastic changes of results in the latter period. The variables, 
income, population, and exports, turn to be relevant. Government, however, turns out in 
opposite way. Policy selectivity is not a determinant of the aid allocation anymore in the 
period. On the other hand, poverty selectivity becomes so strong that none of other sample 
donors exhibit in that extent. The impact of exports is notably enhanced. The impact on 
political motive is decreased, but the impact is still large comparing to other sample donors. 
For over the periods, the aid allocation in Far East Asia has been less altruistic in both 
poverty selectivity and policy selectivity, but selfish motives have become less important 
over time. 
6.2 Comparison with the results from alternative method 
(Tobit model) 
We employed log-linear model for our estimation because it can treat fixed effects, not 
significantly large number of zero data, and for computational reasons, even though it does 
not take into account for the non-linearity in the relationship. There, however, exists 
criticism on the method. For instance, Roodman (2004) pointed out the drawback in the 
method Dollar and Levin (2004) took which employed log-linear model for estimation as we 
did. Thus, here, we perform with a method which treats truncated nature for double checking. 
We employ Tobit model26. The results are reported in table 6-3. As long as computation is 
                                                
26
 The context of choosing Tobit model is discussed in appendix. 
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feasible, the following test procedure depicted in figure 6-2 would be adopted to determine 
whether a random effects Tobit model or Tobit model is appropriate. We, first, perform 
random effects Tobit model and then have a likelihood-ratio test the random effects model 
with the pooled Tobit model. If the null hypothesis that random effects are collectively zero 
is not rejected, random effects Tobit is preferred to pooled Tobit model. If not, Tobit model 
is performed and its result is adopted. 
 
Figure 6-2: Flow chart for opting model for Tobit model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With the regressions with very few zero data, namely cases in Japan, France, and Germany, 
the results are extremely similar to the results from log-linear model. On the other hand, the 
results are discrepant in the regressions which contain a number of zero data, namely, 
aggregated data, USA, UK, and Norway. 
 
In previous section, the aggregated data was estimated with log-linear model with donor-
year fixed effects. Nevertheless, non-linearity is not negligible because approximately 15 
percent of the data is censored as we can see from table 6-3. Thus, the estimation ought to be 
performed with the model which treats non-linearity, even though it cannot treat fixed effects. 
The table reports that all signs are maintained from the results by log-linear model,  
 
 
Perform random effectsTobit 
Likelihood-ratio 
test 
Reject null hypothesis Cannot reject null hypothesis 
 
Random effects Tobit 
 
Tobit 
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Table 6-3:  Tobit results, (a) collective behaviour in all periods and for all sample donors excluding Japan, 1990-2002 
 
Aggregated data 
 
1990-2002 
(Tobit) 
1990-1996 
(Tobit) 
1997-2002 
(Tobit) 
USA 
(Tobit) 
France 
(Tobit) 
UK 
(random) 
Germany 
(random) 
Norway 
(random) 
LN(GDP per capita) -1.518 
(-39.12)*** 
-1.639 
(-29.68)*** 
-1.403 
(-25.58)*** 
-2.219 
(-16.78)*** 
-0.991 
(-15.05)*** 
-1.592 
(-14.66)*** 
-0.810 
(-11.65)*** 
-1.806 
(-17.33)*** 
LN(population) -0.405 
(-14.14)*** 
-0.485 
(-12.01)*** 
-0.334 
(-8.12)*** 
0.038 
(0.42) 
-0.829 
(-15.64)*** 
-0.188 
(-2.39)** 
-0.091 
(-1.54) 
0.663 
(8.94)*** 
LN(lagged exports) 0.629 
(26.58)*** 
0.685 
(20.45)*** 
0.579 
(17.12)*** 
0.430 
(5.59)*** 
0.954 
(21.45)*** 
0.679 
(8.60)*** 
0.303 
(6.30)*** 
0.100 
(1.76)* 
Government -0.295 
(-13.45)*** 
-0.325 
(-10.31)*** 
-0.256 
(-8.43)*** 
-0.801 
(-10.33)*** 
-0.072 
(-2.02)** 
-0.612 
(-11.95)*** 
-0.103 
(-3.20)*** 
-0.139 
(-2.23)** 
UN Friend 1.376 
(12.25)*** 
1.520 
(9.37)*** 
1.271 
(8.22)*** 
1.982 
(5.58)*** 
0.652 
(2.08)** 
2.286 
(5.21)*** 
1.387 
(4.23)*** 
4.234 
(6.22)*** 
Own colonial Dummy 0.801 
(7.01)*** 
1.238 
(7.55)*** 
0.304 
(1.93)* 
1.569 
(3.44)*** 
1.766 
(10.5)*** 
1.499 
(7.62)*** 
0.338 
(1.89)* 
- 
Egypt - - - 4.335 
(3.14)*** 
1.460 
(2.03)** 
-1.014 
(-0.98) 
0.670 
(1.04) 
-1.233 
(-1.06) 
Israel - - - 8.047 
(5.64)*** 
0.436 
(0.60) 
-5.495 
(-5.03)*** 
3.585 
(3.09)*** 
-0.339 
(-0.24) 
Intercept 18.575 
(25.51)*** 
20.755 
(20.35)*** 
16.555 
(15.71)*** 
18.068 
(7.82)*** 
22.465 
(16.35)*** 
16.251 
(7.57)*** 
7.689 
(4.92)*** 
-2.233 
(-1.14) 
Uncensored observations 10068 5226 4842 1436 1820 1669 1817 1395 
Censored observations 1516 871 625 392 124 291 83 530 
likelihood-ratio test, P-
value 
- - - - 1.00 0.00 *** 0.010 *** 0.001 *** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.032 0.035 0.029 0.051 0.083 0.209 0.158 0.291 
[Note] Dependent variable is natural log of  net ODA disbursement received from a certain donor per capita 
Method of estimation: shown in parenthesis below the title of regression(“random” represents random effects Tobit model,  and “Tobit” represents Tobit model) 
Random effects depend on both the year of observation and the donor 
Data is left censored at natural log of 0.0001 
“likelihood-ratio test, P-value” represents P-value obtained from a likelihood-ratio test comparing the random effects model with the pooled (Tobit) model 
t statistics are reported in brackets 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively 
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(b) all sample donors excluding Japan, 1990-1996 and 1997-2002 
 USA France UK Germany Norway 
 
1990-1996 
(Tobit) 
1997-2002 
(random) 
1990-1996 
(Tobit) 
1997-2002 
(Tobit) 
1990-1996 
(Tobit) 
1997-2002 
(Tobit) 
1990-1996 
(random) 
1997-2002 
(Tobit) 
1990-1996 
(random) 
1997-2002 
(random) 
LN(GDP per capita) -2.536 
(-11.8)*** 
-2.089 
(-13.19)*** 
-1.237 
(-12.96)*** 
-0.704 
(-7.86)*** 
-1.565 
(-11.74)*** 
-1.618 
(-9.53)*** 
-0.851 
(-8.90)*** 
-0.740 
(-7.53)*** 
-1.934 
(-12.61)*** 
-1.634 
(-11.49)*** 
LN(population) 0.114 
(0.76) 
-0.240 
(-2.13)** 
-0.929 
(-12.32)*** 
-0.699 
(-9.45)*** 
-0.327 
(-3.41)*** 
-0.002 
(-0.02) 
-0.217 
(-2.67)*** 
0.081 
(0.97) 
0.703 
(6.53)*** 
0.651 
(6.36)*** 
LN(lagged exports) 0.566 
(4.68)*** 
0.479 
(4.92)*** 
1.083 
(16.66)*** 
0.802 
(13.29)*** 
0.511 
(5.20)*** 
0.837 
(6.79)*** 
0.279 
(4.10)*** 
0.308 
(4.65)*** 
0.123 
(1.51) 
0.054 
(0.67) 
Government -0.658 
(-5.21)*** 
-0.818 
(-9.64)*** 
-0.105 
(-2)** 
-0.049 
(-1.03) 
-0.757 
(-11.91)*** 
-0.403 
(-5.12)*** 
-0.140 
(-3.12)*** 
-0.063 
(-1.40) 
-0.215 
(-2.29)** 
-0.074 
(-0.90) 
UN Friend 2.417 
(4.12)*** 
2.378 
(5.91)*** 
0.612 
(1.36) 
0.459 
(1.04) 
1.104 
(2.18)** 
4.085 
(5.72)*** 
1.349 
(2.91)*** 
1.861 
(4.06)*** 
5.217 
(4.19)*** 
3.379 
(4.31)*** 
Own colonial Dummy 0.489 
(0.65) 
2.106 
(4.26)*** 
1.762 
(7.23)*** 
1.755 
(7.71)*** 
1.910 
(7.70)*** 
1.111 
(3.73)*** 
0.567 
(2.22)** 
0.146 
(0.60) 
- - 
Egypt 4.079 
(1.85)* 
4.377 
(2.88)*** 
1.203 
(1.15) 
1.683 
(1.74)* 
-0.562 
(-0.44) 
-1.607 
(-1.00) 
1.257 
(1.41) 
0.020 
(0.02) 
-0.908 
(-0.54) 
-1.644 
(-1.05) 
Israel 9.254 
(4.07)*** 
6.076 
(3.83)*** 
1.469 
(1.40) 
-0.840 
(-0.85) 
-4.188 
(-3.26)*** 
-7.049 
(-3.73)*** 
3.657 
(3.09)*** 
- 2.859 
(1.53) 
-18.817 
(-0.04) 
Intercept 18.398 
(5.00)*** 
24.323 
(8.38)*** 
26.362 
(13.38)*** 
17.885 
(9.36)*** 
18.095 
(6.96)*** 
10.917 
(3.20)*** 
10.143 
(4.72)*** 
3.865 
(1.75)* 
-4.491 
(-1.54) 
-3.723 
(-1.39) 
Uncensored observations 711 725 955 865 894 775 996 851 691 704 
Censored observations 267 125 79 45 119 172 40 43 307 223 
likelihood-ratio test, P-
value 
1.000 0.000 *** 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.049 ** 1.000 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.047 0.223 0.090 0.076 0.058 0.050 0.143 0.059 0.285 0.237 
[Note] Dependent variable is natural log of  net ODA disbursement received from a certain donor per capita 
Method of estimation: shown in parenthesis below the title of regression(“random” represents random effects Tobit model,  and “Tobit” represents Tobit 
model) 
Random effects depend on both the year of observation and the donor 
Data is left censored at natural log of 0.0001 
“likelihood-ratio test, P-value” represents P-value obtained from a likelihood-ratio test comparing the random effects model with the pooled (Tobit) model 
t statistics are reported in brackets.***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively 
“Israel” is dropped in the regression of Germany for the period 1997-2002 because there were no positive aid giving to the country in the period 
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(c) Japan in all periods and regions 
 
All regions Far East Asia Other regions 
 
1990-2002 
(random) 
1990-1996 
(Tobit) 
1997-2002 
(tobit) 
1990-2002 
(tobit) 
1990-1996 
(Tobit) 
1997-2002 
(tobit) 
1990-2002 
(random) 
1990-1996 
(Tobit) 
1997-2002 
(tobit) 
LN(GDP per capita) -1.017 
(-17.24)*** 
-1.190 
(-14.69)*** 
-0.950 
(-11.93)*** 
-1.784 
(-4.75)*** 
-2.482 
(-4.18)*** 
-1.862 
(-5.35)*** 
-0.996 
(-16.47)*** 
-1.153 
(-13.7)*** 
-0.839 
(-10.11)*** 
LN(population) -0.836 
(-19.64)*** 
-0.915 
(-15.41)*** 
-0.791 
(-13.65)*** 
-0.879 
(-3.28)*** 
-1.555 
(-3.71)*** 
-0.733 
(-2.89)*** 
-0.831 
(-19.1)*** 
-0.895 
(-14.71)*** 
-0.753 
(-12.71)*** 
LN(lagged exports) 0.314 
(8.08)*** 
0.424 
(7.99)*** 
0.280 
(5.41)*** 
1.297 
(5.55)*** 
1.287 
(3.32)*** 
1.306 
(6.44)*** 
0.290 
(7.22)*** 
0.396 
(7.07)*** 
0.183 
(3.30)*** 
LN(imports) 0.190 
(6.88)*** 
0.267 
(6.81)*** 
0.148 
(4.03)*** 
-0.457 
(-2.96)*** 
0.205 
(0.65) 
-0.630 
(-5.53)*** 
0.196 
(6.96)*** 
0.260 
(6.45)*** 
0.135 
(3.59)*** 
Government -0.373 
(-11.44)*** 
-0.359 
(-7.81)*** 
-0.365 
(-8.09)*** 
-0.322 
(-3.42)*** 
-0.406 
(-2.66)*** 
-0.098 
(-1.20) 
-0.373 
(-10.97)*** 
-0.349 
(-7.34)*** 
-0.391 
(-8.35)*** 
UN Friend 0.071 
(0.22) 
-1.785 
(-3.74)*** 
1.737 
(3.98)*** 
3.758 
(3.98)*** 
4.618 
(3.27)*** 
4.094 
(4.47)*** 
-0.228 
(-0.66) 
-2.226 
(-4.44)*** 
1.459 
(3.23)*** 
Far East Asia Dummy 0.943 
(4.02)*** 
- - - - - - - - 
Intercept 23.961 
(21.87)*** 
28.628 
(19.26)*** 
21.268 
(14.39)*** 
28.102 
(3.78)*** 
44.642 
(3.93)*** 
24.892 
(3.49)*** 
23.917 
(21.5)*** 
28.217 
(18.36)*** 
19.611 
(12.81)*** 
Uncensored 
observations 
1860 974 886 129 68 61 1731 906 825 
Censored observations 45 32 13 3 2 1 42 30 12 
likelihood-ratio test, P-
value 
0.032 ** 0.258 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.331 0.043 ** 0.309 1.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.252 0.070 0.070 0.136 0.128 0.252 0.257 0.070 0.073 
[Note] Dependent variable is natural log of  net ODA disbursement received from a certain donor per capita 
Method of estimation: shown in parenthesis below the title of regression(“random” represents random effects Tobit model,  and “Tobit” represents Tobit 
model) 
Random effects depend on both the year of observation and the donor 
Data is left censored at natural log of 0.0001 
“likelihood-ratio test, P-value” represents P-value obtained from a likelihood-ratio test comparing the random effects model with the pooled (Tobit) model 
t statistics are reported in brackets.***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively 
“Israel” is dropped in the regression of Germany for the period 1997-2002 because there were no positive aid giving to the country in the period 
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however, we can see several notable changes on their extent, especially UN friend. 
Geopolitical motive has been enhanced over time in the previous estimation whereas it has 
been weakened. All the results imply that in the collective donors’ behaviour, altruistic 
motives have been weakened while selfish motives have also been weakened over time. 
 
Although magnitude of coefficients notably changed in regressions for USA, UK, and 
Norway, most of arguments made above can be maintained except two. UK has been more 
poverty focused and geopolitical motive has been weakened in the US aid allocation over 
time. 
6.3 Analysis of the results 
All the argument so far reveals that the results from section 6.1 are valid estimation results. 
As we have expected after the East Asian financial crisis extra impact on the aid flow to Far 
East Asia, with other factors fixed, is increased. The comparative analysis of different 
regions supports the patterns of factors which drive aid flow are different among the regions.  
 
Japan is relatively poverty focused with respect to Far East Asia. The magnitude is quite 
large. Japan, in practice, rewards fewer income recipients in other regions as well. But the 
magnitude is much smaller than what it does for Far East Asia, and also relatively small. It 
incurs that Japanese poverty selectivity is relatively weak. Before the financial crisis, Japan 
used to be policy focused to Far East Asia but the effect has disappeared in the latter period. 
On the other hand, policy selectivity has been enhanced over time in the other regions. 
 
If we see the terms of commercial motives, Japan gives more aid to the recipients with more 
imports from Japan regardless of regions. The impact has been almost stable over the periods 
in Far East Asia while it has been less important in the other area. On the other hand, 
commercial motives to promote Japan’s imports only exist for aid allocation to the other 
regions. That implies that in contrast to the expectation, Japanese project aid in Far East Asia 
does not incur Japanese imports promotion whereas Japanese aid to the other region may be 
exploited in order to sustain Japanese resource imports. It can be inferred from table 6-2. 
Countries in the Middle East, South America, and Africa play important role in Japanese 
resource imports whereas their contribution in Japanese export market are relatively weak. 
Besides, resource imports are crucial part in Japanese trade. On the other hand, Asia plays 
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very important role in Japanese export markets; it is major destination in most of major 
commodities. 
 
Table 6-4: Breakdown in Japanese trade 
  Regional Share 
 
Major 
Commodity 
Groups share Asia Middle East Europe 
North 
America 
Central 
America 
South 
America Africa Oceania 
Export Total - 0.48  0.03  0.17  0.25  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.03  
 
Vehicles other 
than railway, 
tramway 
0.21  0.13  0.07  0.22  0.45  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.07  
 
Electrical, 
electronic 
equipment 
0.21  0.60  0.01  0.16  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  
 
Nuclear reactors, 
boilers, 
machinery, etc 
0.20  0.48  0.02  0.20  0.26  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.02  
 
Optical, photo, 
technical, medical, 
etc apparatus 
0.06  0.58  0.01  0.16  0.22  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  
 Iron and steel 0.04  0.87  0.02  0.02  0.06  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  
Import Total - 0.44  0.17  0.14  0.15  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.05  
 Iron and steel 0.04  0.87  0.02  0.02  0.06  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  
 
Mineral fuels, oils, 
distillation 
products, etc 
0.26  0.21  0.64  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.09  
 
Electrical, 
electronic 
equipment 
0.12  0.79  0.00  0.06  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
 
Nuclear reactors, 
boilers, 
machinery, etc 
0.10  0.64  0.00  0.15  0.21  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
 
Optical, photo, 
technical, medical, 
etc apparatus 
0.04  0.34  0.01  0.27  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
 Ores, slag and ash 0.03  0.20  0.00  0.02  0.08  0.00  0.33  0.07  0.32  
[Note] Source: OECD (2007) 
          Only top 5 commodity groups are reported in the table. 
 
 
Of The other selfish motives, geopolitical motive, are strikingly strong in Far East Asia. That 
in the other region is also not negligible. There were no geopolitical motives in the former 
period whereas it has positive effects at statistically significant level in the latter period. 
 
Since the prosperity in the surrounded region is beneficial to Japan due to a number of stakes, 
Japan may be poverty focused and policy focused with an intension of poverty alleviation 
throughout the region even though the magnitude has been weakened over time. However, 
the regional importance also drives both commercial motives and political motives although 
the motives have become smaller over time. The aid allocation to the other region also has 
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been less altruistic and pattern of selfish motives have been changing over time. Geopolitical 
tie has been more important and commercial motive has been less. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we were interested in major determinants why Japanese aid allocation differs 
by countries and regions. We performed an aid allocation analysis that accounts for pattern 
of Japanese aid allocation being different between recipients especially in Far East Asia and 
the other regions. We first have seen how the components of aid allocation to Far East Asia 
and the other region differ. It revealed that one of the distinctive features of the components 
of aid allocation to Far East Asia is that bulk is non-grant aid and technical cooperation and 
project aid occupies large portion. 
 
In line with Dollar and Levin (2004) and Canavire et al (2005), the impact of poverty 
focused aid is relatively weak in the Japanese aid allocation to recipients in the other regions. 
However, Japanese aid allocation to the recipients in Far East Asia is more poverty focused 
according to the econometric results. In practice, the impact is large compared to other 
donors considered in my sample. Weak poverty selectivity in the other regions leads overall 
weak poverty selectivity of Japan. We employed as a variable “government” which indicates 
level of governance in the recipients as another altruistic indicator. Japanese aid giving 
behaviour is policy focused regardless of region but Japan is more policy focused with 
respect to the other regions than that for Far East Asia. Project aid predominates in the aid to 
Far East Asia. Canavire et al (2005) argued project aid would tend to be given to less well-
governed recipients and under strict surveillance by donors, while programme aid, at least in 
principle, would be tilted in favor of well governed recipients and involve less external 
control. Furthermore, since many of recipients in Far East Asia is relatively well-governed, 
the variable government does not vary significantly, especially in recent years. The altruistic 
terms are significant in the allocative behaviour to the recipients in Far East Asia, although 
selfish terms are also quite significant. The export related self interest provides a fairly 
strong incentive to grant aid to recipients in Far East Asia. Strong political motives are also 
behind the aid allocation. For other regions, export related self interest is not so strong but 
import related self interest is behind Japanese aid allocation. It allows us to infer that Japan 
exploits aid to obtain sustainable resource imports. Hence, the allocative behaviour is clearly 
different by region; allocative behaviour to Far East Asia is strongly altruistic but also 
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strongly selfish and that to the other region is altruistic at certain extent and not strongly 
selfish. 
 
The allocative pattern changes over time, especially before and after the financial crisis in 
East Asia in 1997. For Far East Asia, it became less altruistic, and also furthermore weaker 
political motives. For the other regions, Japan has been more policy focused but less poverty 
focused. The pattern of selfish motives also has changed over time, commercial motive has 
been less important but geopolitical motive has been more emphasized. 
 
My study revealed that empirical findings in the literatures cannot be applicable if we 
decompose recipients by regions. Canavire et al (2005) find out that Japan is not poverty 
focused compared to other donors. My study also agreed with the analysis without 
decomposition but decomposition shows that Japan is strongly poverty focused regarding 
Far East Asia. Studies of Berthelemy and Tichit (2002), Dollar and Levin (2004), and Isopi 
and Mavrotas(2006) show Japan is relatively policy focused. Contrast to insistence of Dollar 
and Levin (2004) that Japanese policy selectivity ascribes to its preference to Far East Asia, 
Japan is highly policy focused among the region before financial crisis in East Asia. 
However, Japan is not policy focused among the region after the incident. Berthelemy and 
Tichit (2002), Cooray and Shahiduzzaman (2004), Canavire et al (2005), and Isopi and 
Mavrotas (2006) assert that strong commercial motive is behind Japanese aid allocation. 
This finding can be applicable to Japanese aid allocative behaviour to Far East Asia but not 
to the other regions. The finding of Alesina and Dollar (2000) that strong geopolitical motive 
is behind Japanese aid allocation is applicable with respect to Far East Asia but not to the 
other regions in especially earlier period. 
 
In order to attain the Millennium Development Goals, putting less weight on its self-interest 
in providing aid is indispensable. We can see improvement in Japanese aid allocative 
behaviour to Far East Asia. But the improvement is scanty. For the other regions, we see 
converse phenomenon, stronger import and geopolitical motives. Furthermore altruistic 
terms in both regions have been weakened. The pictures indicate that there still have a lot of 
rooms to improve to accomplish the goals. 
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Appendix A: Choice of Non-linear models 
In earlier literature such as Berthelemy and Tichit (2002), Canavire et al (2005), and so forth, 
following three measures have been introduced to deal with this type of situation, all based 
on the maximum likelihood method. 
 
 Two-part model: in the first step, a Probit model determines the probability of receiving 
aid (selection equation), and in a second, a linear model explaining aid disbursement is 
estimated, based only on strictly positive observations (allocation equation). 
ijtijtijt
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Where i  stands for the donor, j  for the recipient and t  for the year, u  and v  are 
independent and normally distributed error terms, and 
Y : the dependent variable, i.e. the amount of aid disbursement per capita. 
Z  and X : explanatory variable for the selection equation and the allocation equation 
respectively. b  and c  are corresponding vectors. 
(.)F : the cumulative distribution function 
 
 Heckman’s method: the procedure is the same as for the two-part model, except that u  
and v  are not assumed independent. It can be implemented either in two-step estimation 
method, or in a one-step maximum likelihood procedure. In the two-step method, one 
first estimates the Probit selection equation. Then in a second step, the inverse Mill’s 
ratio obtained from the first step is introduced together with explanatory variables, in 
order to correct selection bias due to the endogenous nature of the allocation of the 
selection process. 
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Where u  and v  are normally distributed error terms, with ρ=),cov( vu  and f  stands 
for the partial distribution function and σ  for the variance of u . 
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 Tobit model: estimates the aid disbursements in only one-step, taking directly into 
account its truncated nature. The difference with the Heckman’s method is that 
exogenous variables are supposed to have the same impact on the probability of 
receiving aid and on the amount of aid allocated thereafter: aid received is described as 
the maximum of zero and of a linear combination of the explanatory variables. 
)0,( ijtijtijt ubXMaxY +=  
 
Canavire et al (2005) insist that crucial assumption underlying two-part model is that the 
choice of the recipient and the amount of aid allocated are independent from each other (u  
and v   are not correlated). If this assumption does not hold, which appears to be highly 
plausible, the regression in the second step suffers from a selection bias. In the Heckman 
procedure, if the same set of independent variables is employed in both equations, estimates 
can become unreliable due to severe multicollinearity problem. Since it is very difficult to 
find appropriate exclusion variables for the first step of Heckman procedure, the study opted 
for the Tobit model. Many other studies such as Berthelemy and Tichit (2002), and Isopi and 
Mavrotas (2006) have also opted the approach. Notwithstanding, Tobit model is not without 
disadvantages. Berthelemy (2006b) insists that the Tobit model, with a very large database, 
is hardly manageable with a large number of explanatory variables, for computational 
reasons. Furthermore, some of the equations of my study were concluded that introducing 
the fixed effects was the best choice, however, this raises a technical issue27, an incidental 
parameters problem. Greene (2002) insists that the fixed effects maximum likelihood 
estimator is inconsistent when the length of the panel is fixed. In the models that have been 
examined in detail, it appears also to be biased in finite samples. 
 
                                                
27
 At least, the command for Tobit model with conditional fixed effects is not available in STATA, as there 
does not exist a sufficient statistic allowing the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood.  
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Appendix B: Data and Sources 
Variable Description Source 
Aid per capita Net disbursements of official development 
assistance without emergency relief divided by 
the population of the recipient country; US 
dollars in constant 2004 price 
OECD Development Aid 
Committee 
database(international 
development statistics) 
 
Donor exports Share of exports of donor country i to 
recipient country j in total exports of donor 
country i; percent; lagged one year behind 
OECD (International Trade 
Statistics) 
 
 
Japanese imports Share of imports of recipient country j to 
Japan in total imports of Japan; percent 
OECD (International Trade 
Statistics) 
 
Population Total population in recipient countries OECD (Population Statistics) 
 
Government Freedom House democracy index. 
Average of indices for political rights and civil 
liberties. Both indicators are assessed into 
from 1 to 7. 1 represents the most free and 7 
the least free rating. 
 
Freedom House(Freedom in 
the World Historical Rankings) 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita; US dollars in constant 
2004 price 
 
United Nations Statistics 
Division 
Far East Asian 
Dummy 
Set equal to “1” if recipient belongs to Far 
East Asian region. The list of the countries is 
Cambodia, China, Chinese Taipei, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Korea Dem. Rep., Korea 
Laos, Macao, Malaysia, Mongolia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-
Leste, and Viet Nam. Set equal to “0” for 
otherwise. 
 
OECD 
Colonial Dummy Set equal to “1” for former colonies. Set equal 
to “0” for otherwise. This variable is derived 
individually to USA, UK, France, and 
Germany. 
 
World Statesmen 
UN-friend Based on UN voting patterns, the UN-friend 
index ranges from -1 to 1, with higher values 
indicating more similar voting patterns. 
 
Gartzke and Jo(2000)(The 
Affinity of Nations:  Similarity 
of State Voting Positions in the 
UNGA) 
 
Right Wing 
Dummy 
Set equal to “1” if government party is right 
wing at beginning of certain year. Set equal 
“0” for otherwise. 
 
 
